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ABSTRACT
Strategic missile defense or anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems are considered deterrence by
denial assets. The debate on the question if these systems stabilize or destabilize the balance of
power between nuclear powers is still unresolved. This work reviews this impact using the
example of the East – West relationship by focusing on NATO´s missile defense efforts. This is
done in two parts. The first is a historical part, reviewing the East – West relationship during the
Cold War based on strategic arsenals, crisis events and arms control talks related to missile
defense developments. The second part reviews the development since the year 2000, using
again strategic arsenals, crisis events, arms control talks as well as a comparison of missile
defense of NATO and the Russian Federation. Neither the historical analysis nor the current
situation analysis show a significant escalation-causing character of ABM systems. Especially in
the historical view, ABM systems appear to have had a stabilizing effect. However, each
development in missile defense creates a picture of a future where the technological advantage of
an adversary could outpace offensive capabilities, degrading the offensive capabilities of a
nation. The current situation shows in detail that such a future never took form and likely won’t
for the foreseeable future. It shows how immense the disadvantage of a defender against a
nuclear attack would be. There are physical constraints to position interceptors to be able to
successfully intercept a missile. More importantly the cost of one intercept is significantly higher
than the cost of an attacking missile. These constrains make the development and deployment of
missile defense against a major Russian missile attack almost impossible. Russia, on the opposite
side, communicates about missile defense primarily when trying to create a picture of NATO as
an aggressor trying to mitigate Russia´s rightful ability for nuclear defense. This narrative is
completely false. Russia is not the main target for NATO´s missile defense efforts and is only to
a very limited degree influenced by the systems. Current missile defense systems contribute on
two levels to stability. Firstly, deterrence by denial towards rogue regimes that don´t have the
capabilities to overcome the defense. Secondly, by creating the ability to stop an accidental
launch. Missile defense should therefore not be subject to restrictive arms control treaties.
KEYWORDS: missile defense, deterrence, deterrence by denial, NATO, Russian Federation,
international relationship, arms control
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INTRODUCTION

Tension has been building in NATO's relationship with Russia since 1995. The EastWest conflict of the Cold War had been replaced for a short time by Russian internationalism
after the fall of the Soviet Union. The dream for lasting cooperation did not last long and the
relationship deteriorated after a short time due to divergent positions. The different views
became apparent during events such as the Bosnian War or the Kosovo War. The culminating
point was the Russian Invasion of Ukrainian provinces, destabilizing Europe's east. Earlier,
Russia had attacked Georgia in 2008 and carried out cyber-attacks on Estonia’s IT-system in
2007. In the process leading up to and accompanying the invasion, Russia created a significant
amount of disinformation campaigns in addition to non-conventional procedures to attack
Ukraine and seize Crimea causing the world to see a new version of conflict which is called
“hybrid-warfare.” One aspect of Russia's Information Operations is to put blame on NATO as
the aggressive opponent.1 Part of Russia´s narrative was to paint NATO´s ballistic missile
defense (BMD) effort as part of a Western plan to threaten Russia's role as a global power.2 The
one treaty on anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense was the United States and Soviet Union ABM
treaty of 1972, from which the U.S. withdrew in 2002 in accordance with the treaty to establish a
national missile defense system. The plan was to protect the U.S. against potential future threats
from rogue regimes such as North Korea or Iran, which would acquire long range missile
capabilities.3 The system would later include a footprint in Europe to increase protection against

1

Lesley Kucharsky, Russian Multi-Domain Strategy against NATO: information confrontation and U.S. forwarddeployed nuclear weapons in Europe, (2018) 23.
2
Ibid.
3
Elenor Albert. ´North Korea’s Military Capabilities´, (2020).
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Iran. The system, however, received a lot of attention from the Russian Federation and
repeatedly became the object of public Russian statements. The repeated connotation of U.S.
missile defense efforts as something hostile and part of NATO aggression in Russian
communication indicate a potential impact of ABM defenses on the East-West relationship.
Within this context it seems to be relevant to qualify, and if possible, quantify the impact
ABM has on this relationship. Do ABMs enhance strategic stability between adversaries by
protecting forces and increasing a nation´s deterrence capabilities, or do they threaten stability by
eroding the equilibrium created by vulnerability to offensive nuclear capabilities? How has the
impact changed from the Cold War era to the 21st century setting of hybrid warfare?
Therefore, the following work will try to contribute to an analysis of the impact ABMs
had in the past to an understanding of strategic stability and will allow an assessment for the
future. After providing a comprehensive overview of missile defense in general, an overview of
the impact of missile defense within the framework and concepts of deterrence will be presented.
The discussion of deterrence will be focused on nuclear deterrence and leave conventional
deterrence aside. After an overview on general concepts, this paper will establish the impact of
ballistic missile defense in different phases of the historical East-West relationship during the
Cold War. Finally, the current NATO missile defense efforts will be described and analyzed in
the context of the NATO – Russia relationship to identify a potential impact of missile defense
on that relationship. This will lead to recommendations on supporting missile defense efforts,
should NATO desire to proceed. The aim of this thesis is to analyze the impact of ballistic
missile defense and to determine if missile defense destabilizes strategic stability. For this
analysis of the missile defense impact on the NATO- Russia-relationship, historical comparisons,
legal frameworks, official and state-related statements, and significant events (as baseline

2

indicators) will be used to assess the quality of this impact. The numbers of strategic nuclear
arsenals, launching systems, and trends in their developments will additionally serve as
indicators for the impact of missile defense.
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BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IN GENERAL

The term ballistic missile defense (BMD) describes a variety of different military and
civilian concepts and technology. BMD includes the technology, systems, and procedures to
defeat the impact of ballistic missiles before they hit their target. BMD systems consist of
command-and-control structures, sensors (i.e., radar units) and effect causing units (i.e.,
interceptor missile launchers). Their aim is to destroy the incoming missile before it hits the
designated target. BMD can be characterized by its impact on the destruction of incoming
missiles – strategic, operational, tactical as well as cruise missiles. Missile defense systems are
designed to work within specific ranges of targets. Focusing on certain characteristics of various
BMD systems they are applicable against various deadly incoming ballistic and cruise missiles.
BMD systems can be combined with ground forces to destroy short and medium-range missiles
and give the ground forces greater freedom of movement and protection.
The assets that comprise the missile defense system can be either land-based, sea-going,
air, or space-based systems. Currently, there are systems in operation that utilize no space-based
interceptors. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) prohibits the placement of nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction and limits the orbit to peaceful use, which refers to non-aggression
as opposed to non-military use.4 Thus, space-based interceptors would be permitted under the
OST. Air assets that can intercept ballistic missiles fulfill this task commonly as a secondary role
besides their main air combat task. The USAF and later the Missile Defense Agency conducted
research on airborne laser BMD capabilities. The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)-kill

4

Pamela Meredith, ´The Legality of a High Technology Missile Defense System: The ABM and Outer Space Treaty.
1984´, The American Journal of International Law Vol. 78 No. 2 (April 1984) 423.
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role was considered, for example, for the F-35 jet by the Pentagon.5 Sea and land-based systems
are the two most common domains from which missile defense systems operate.

Categorization
Missile defense systems can be categorized along different parameters like the
technology used for sensors and interceptors. These systems work either projectile-based,
missile-based, or energy-based. Energy beam-based systems are still in the phase of development
and only prototypes have been used to progress the research.6 Missile defense systems can also
be categorized by interceptor technology employed or by the flight phase in which they intercept.
As this thesis focusses on strategic systems the characterization along the categories of tactical,
operational/ theater, and strategic ballistic missile defense systems is further described.
Tactical Missile Defense. Short range characterizes most tactical anti-ballistic missile
systems. Their goal is to defend a small area like field camps or smaller size forces against the
threat of tactical ballistic missiles. With their short-range and low effector speed, their impact in
a conflict may be limited. They often work against rockets and short range cruise and ballistic
missiles. An example of a tactical missile defense system (or SHORAD as it is known) is
MANTIS systems (Modular, Automatic and Network capable Targeting and Interception
System), a field camp defense system. This system works based on fixed radar and anti-air-gun
towers in the perimeter of a field camp. It provides protection against rockets, artillery and
mortar (RAM) fire. The counter-RAM capability will be expanded in the future to counter short

5
6

Valerie Insinna. ´Pentagon considers an ICBM-killing weapon for the F-35, but is it affordable?´, (2019).
Thomas Karako, Ian Williams, and Wes Rumbaugh, Missile Defense 2020 April 2017 Next Steps for Defending
the Homeland (Rowmann&Littlefield April 2017), 112.
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range ballistic missiles by deploying interceptor missiles.7
Operational/Theater Missile Defense. Operational or theater missile defense systems
aim to protect military assets of high value or large areas against missiles with greater range,
speed, and payload. These systems use missiles to intercept incoming enemy ballistic or cruise
missiles. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and PATRIOT missile defense
systems are examples of theater missile defense systems in this category. PATRIOT played a key
role in selected spaces along the Turkish border during Operation Active Fence -since 2013- to
reassure Turkey and defend its border region against the possible threat of Syrian ballistic
missiles.
Strategic Missile Defense. Strategic-level ballistic missile defense systems work against
long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles. They impact an adversary’s ability to reach key
command and control structures, cities, military bases, and nuclear strike capabilities. These
systems use missiles to intercept, and sometimes even use nuclear payloads to deflect incoming
missiles.
There is no strict line along which these systems must be classified. The deployment of a
system and the environment in which it is used can influence classification and perception. The
Iron Dome for example, aims against Kazham short-range missiles used by HAMAS forces and
would therefore classify as theater missile defense system. However, Israel sees the system as
strategic due to the protection it provides for its population.8
For this thesis, the focus will stay on strategic missile defense systems that target
intermediate-to-long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying nuclear payloads.

7

Justyna Gotkowska, ´The current state, problems and future of Germany´s air and missile defense´, OSW
Commentary No 105 (April 10, 2013) 3.
8
Jerusalem Post, ´Vilnai: Israel has strategic reason not to use Iron Dome´, Jerusalem Post, March 24, 2011.
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Point of Interception
An adversary can impact a ballistic missile in different stages of an attack. The phases are
off the launcher, on the launcher, in the boost phase, mid-course, and terminal phase.
Left of Launch. All phases before the targeted missile is launched are called left-oflaunch-phases. They usually are not targets of ballistic missile defense systems which are
designed to target missiles in flight.
Theoretically, it would be possible to include even earlier phases such as development
and production to impact an adversary's ability to hit a target with ballistic missiles successfully.
Considerations about these early phases fall mainly into the realm of arms/technology control
and are not further analyzed in this work.
Other weapon systems, which could fulfill a missile defense role and destroy a missile
left of launch, with the exception of space-based laser technology, will not be included in the
discussion of the thesis to keep the focus on missile defense systems as a primary task.
Boost Phase and Ascent. The next phase in which a ballistic missile can be impacted is
in the boost phase when it starts its trajectory with an extreme accelerator to reach travel height
and direction. Besides the obvious possibility of destruction in this phase, there is the possibility
to disrupt the planned trajectory by influencing the boost phase, leading to a reduction or loss of
accuracy.
Mid-Course. This phase accounts for most of the distance traveled by ballistic missiles.
After the boost phase sets the general course of the missile, the missile approaches its target. This
consists mainly of exo-atmospheric travel time for long-range missiles before initiating the
terminal phase by reentering the atmosphere again. In this phase, the threat of interception for
ballistic missiles is not significantly increased even though it follows a predictable and steady

7

trajectory. Especially for long-range missiles, a significant part of this phase stays beyond most
defense systems' range. Current long-range systems (U.S.) were developed to overcome this
challenge and target missiles in their midcourse flight phase. The flight height above the
atmosphere keeps them out of range for many defense systems.9
Terminal-Phase. The terminal phase starts with the final approach to reach a target. In
this phase long-range nuclear missiles are splitting their multiple reentry vehicles apart and begin
their descent into the atmosphere to reach their ground located targets. Terminal-phase intercepts
of ballistic missiles are the most commonly used approach to missile defense by non-strategic
system.10 Within this phase, the final approach trajectory of a missile can be calculated. Most
missiles do not have systems to change their trajectory in this phase, and even if they can change
their trajectory, the overall impact is insignificant to potential changes in mid-course or in the
boost phase. The vulnerability of a missile is high in its terminal phase because it is within the
optimal range of defense systems, but there are still factors mitigating this vulnerability. In this
phase, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) give an advantage, if carried
by a missile, by forcing a defender to distribute interceptors to multiple targets. Overwhelming a
defense system in this phase is more likely than in earlier phases, given the potential use of many
targets that either split from fewer missiles or by focusing an attack into a confined space. The
moment of reentry adds to the challenges of a defender as the atmospheric interferences hamper
radar-sensing. A disadvantage of terminal phase intercepts is the increased probability of
collateral compared to earlier phase intercepts. For conventional missile defense, this effect is
neglectable, but given the effects of radioactive material or chemical fallout, mitigation of these

9

Gary A. Sullins, ´Exo-atmospheric Intercepts: Bringing New Challenges to Standard Missile Gary,´ Johns Hopkins
APL Technical Digest Vol. 22 No. 3 (2001) 260.
10
Center for Arms Control and Non Proliferation. ´Fact Sheet: U.S. Ballistic missile Defense´, (2021).
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effects can be necessary when intercepting missiles with such payloads. Still, an intercept
without fallout mitigation is the far better alternative than no intercept.
It is essential to understand the trajectory of missiles, so as to know at which point a
missile defense system can intercept this trajectory, in order to fully understand the effectiveness
of missile defense systems. Figure 1 shows an example of an ICBM – trajectory in various stages
from start to impact, illustrating the distribution of travel time between the phases and the
potential distance between a defense system and the launch-point.

Figure 1. Ballistic Missile Trajectory Characteristic - shows the trajectory of a missile. The
trajectory is divided into the Boost phase, Ascent, Midcourse and Terminal Phase. 11
This trajectory concept translates to all forms of ballistic missiles with some variations. Silo
Based, thus fixed, ICBMs have a defined medium and maximum range, while mobile forces such
as mobile ICBMs or SLBMs also do have a minimum and maximum range. However, the

11

Steeljaw – Blog. ´ICBM Fundamentals´, (2007).

9

endpoints are not fixed due to the possibility of change in starting point location. By adapting the
trajectory, it is possible to create further challenges for missile defense. A flatter trajectory could
impose challenges on the tracking systems. Controlled changes of trajectories by engines or
control units could evade interceptor missiles. The variations of a missile trajectory (without
additional changes in the course) is depicted in figure 2. Most non-strategic missile defense
systems are designed to intercept in the terminal phase, and only more advanced systems against
long-range missiles target the midcourse phase.

Figure 2. Missile Trajectory Variations - shows the variation of trajectories, which defines the
maximum and minimum range of a ballistic missile.12

There is currently no system that successfully intercepts in the boost phase. Missile defense
systems that engage a target in an early trajectory phase create better protection as they leave the
defender with a chance for further attempts to intercept. If an intercept in the terminal phase fails,
there is no room for further attempts.

12

Congressional Budget Office. A CBO Study - Options for Deploying Missile Defenses in Europe, (2009), 50.
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While the launcher is potentially known, the target can be a matter of judgment and
prediction and not always of precise calculation. At the same time, early phase intercepts require
significantly advanced technology as an interceptor either has to be very close by or outpace a
missile to intercept it early. Longer ranges and greater interceptor speed reduces the needed
number of defense system per adversarial launcher, as they enable repeated intercept attempts.
Missile defense systems face further challenges by countermeasures that missile attacks utilize to
overcome the defense.

Means to counter Ballistic Missile Defense systems
Missile defense countermeasures range from specific methods of attack to technology
carried by a ballistic missile. Different methods of attack to counter missile defense systems are
approaches like saturation or evasion. Saturation is the concept of employing more missiles than
the defender's system can intercept because it does not have enough launchers, the sensor
capacity is too low, or sensors with the command and control structure are too slow to assign
targets.
Avoidance leaves out a defended area from an attack and aims at a less or undefended
target. This method works mainly with counter-value approaches in deterrence, as will be
described later. Saturation and avoidance pose the most significant problems for defenders as the
attacker decides where to use and how to focus forces; this concept also applies for conventional
forces.
Some missiles use an evasion approach based on additional booster rockets to be fired
to evade an incoming interceptor or by using endo- or exoatmospheric maneuvers to change
trajectory. Stealth technology can also hamper a defender's ability to acquire a target by radar,
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thus increasing the survivability of a missile. Decoys are an approach to lead missile defense
systems to spend their limited numbers of interceptor missiles, increasing the chance of a
successful attack. They often work similarly to aircraft defense systems and fire objects that
obfuscate or duplicate heat signatures. The short overview given on missile defense counter
measures, while not complete, makes it clear that the defender suffers disadvantages even though
Clausewitz defined the defense as the stronger form of war. Modern ballistic missile interceptors
are often more expensive than the target they aim at. Even given equal cost the attacker is likely
to achieve a successful hit by focusing ballistic missile assets on a limited number of targets as
the defender has to spread out the defense or leave some areas undefended.

12

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE AND DETERRENCE

The complete discussion about missile defense unfolds around the concepts of deterrence.
Deterrence is the idea to discourage an enemy from taking an unwelcome action by the threat of
retaliation that would be unacceptable to the aggressor.13 There are two ways to deter an enemy,
either by the threat of punishment or by denial measures preventing an enemy from achieving
their objectives. “A capability to deny amounts to a capability to defend.”14 Ballistic missile
defense is an asset of deterrence by denial by defending forces or population against a missile
attack. By increasing the survivability of forces it adds to the credibility of deterrence by
punishment efforts.
Deterrence by punishment is based on the threat of retaliation by force, conventional or
nuclear.15 Deterrence by denial is designed to increase the cost of an attack for a given opponent
to an amount that the cost of the attack is, in the end, higher than the potential outcome, thus
making the attack unfavorable and more difficult to achieve desired objectives.16
However, to create a deterrence by denial more than just missile defense is necessary as
the denial only works if enough adversarial means to attack are bound to fail. Missile defense
can support this approach and be a significant building block especially if an adversary relies
primarily on ballistic missiles and has only inferior conventional forces. Within this constellation
missile defense could deny an enemy credible escalation steps like limited strikes or even deny
strikes on a greater scale. Denying an adversary escalation steps or even their overall approach to
attacks could deter an enemy to attack in general. As chances of achieving goals are reduced, the

13

Michael Rühle. ´Deterrence: what it can (and cannot) do´, (2015).
Michael J. Mazarr, Understanding Deterrence (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2018).
15
Kestutis Paulauskas. ´On Deterrence´, (2016).
16
Ibid.
14
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calculated expected gain decreases, which in turn makes the attack too costly in terms of risk and
reward. Additionally, already in the set-up process (before full deployment), missile defense
systems fulfill add fundamental early warning and intelligence capabilities with their sensors and
the data they provide.
Contemporary discussions about deterrence are significantly based around the ideas of
easy and difficult deterrence, where easy deterrence defines only force requirements, while the
difficult deterrence proponents see the need to adapt deterrence to the enemy.17, The narrative of
easy deterrence relies heavily on predictability of the escalation of conflict and the required
means to deter, thus easy to understand.18 The narrative of difficult deterrence acknowledges that
it is potentially dangerous to assume an enemy is acting cautiously because many influence
factors are not completely uncovered before it is too late and another escalation happens.19 The
idea of difficult deterrence includes recognizing that there is also a potential for deterrence to
destabilize if the adversaries' perception is not the intended one.
Herman Kahn introduced the concept of an escalation ladder by defining 44 steps of
conflict based on a potential conflict of the Soviet Union against the West. At the same time, he
acknowledged that his ladder did not take asymmetries in thinking and perception of these steps
into account, and other dimensions were excluded from the model that showed conflict only as
unidimensional back and forth between steps of violence that could be controlled.20 Herman
Kahn´s acknowledging asymmetries between adversaries almost makes a case for difficult
deterrence. With conflict being a multidimensional net of potential paths, many influence factors

17

Igor Ivanov, ´The Missile-Defense Mistake: Undermining Strategic Stability and the ABM Treaty´, Foreign
Affairs (September/October 2000).
18
Keith B. Payne, ´The Great Divide in US Deterrence Thought´, Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol. 14 No. 2
(Summer 2020) 18.
19
Keith B. Payne, ´The Great Divide in US Deterrence Thought´, 30.
20
Paul Davis and Peter Stan, Concepts and Models of Escalation (Rand Strategy Assessment Center 1984), 3 – 7.
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create asymmetries by lowering or raising escalation thresholds. Arms acquisition and rising
military budgets potentially raises the threshold for an adversary to escalate a conflict by
contributing to a nation's deterrence capabilities. At the same time, it could push the opponent to
perceive the situation as hostile even though the acquisitions are planned for defensive purposes.
This perception of the armed defender as preparing for conflict could in turn increase the
probability of conflict by creating a perception of rising tension or even offensive plans.
Communication and information exchange are key to influence the development of perception
and prevent it from becoming hostile.
Damage mitigation measures such as missile defense could raise the threshold as it denies
an adversary the chance of a successful attack or mitigates the attack causing the opponent to use
far more of his precious assets. Missile defense in this regard has the potential to be stabilizing
by showing an adversary that an attack would be of no use or with little chances of success.
However, nuclear use, especially by smaller nations, could be triggered by irrational
mechanisms; some of these irrational mechanisms could be based on wrong beliefs like using-itor-lose-it about nuclear weapons.21 Even though the concept is wrong as there is no automatism
that a conflict partner has to escalate in certain asymmetric situations as the only option
necessarily, opponents may be misguided by such concepts. Missile defense potentially plays
into this and increases the perceived asymmetry. Therefore, this thesis will analyze the existence
of an asymmetry in the relationship of the analyzed conflict participants. Another possibility, as
stated above, are other influential factors such as the forward stationing of forces for extended
missile defense-based deterrence by denial or the existence of extended deterrence by denial in
general.

21

David Logan. The Varied Roads to Armageddon - Unpacking the Use-It-Or-Lose-It Dilemma, (2020), 8.
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Both kinds of deterrence measures can be extended to allies. For ballistic missile
defense, extension often includes the stationing of missile defense forces, naval vessels, or
infrastructure to extend the range of the system to the supported ally's territory. This aspect of
extended deterrence by denial/damage mitigation measures makes it vulnerable to narratives of
aggression as forces/assets often have to be stationed on the territory of an ally or close by. This
could put assets of the deterrence-extending partner closer to an adversary’s border. This was a
side effect which became apparent when the U.S. thought about extending their missile defense
system to Europe to create a mutual defense against Iranian threats. The planned missile defense
contained the stationing of U.S. interceptor systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. Such
plans created the opportunity for Russia (being the adversary close by) to include it into its
communication strategy. The quality of this impact on the NATO – Russia relationship will be
discussed later.
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U.S. AND NATO'S HISTORIC MISSILE DEFENSE IMPACT

During the Cold War - especially in the beginning when the European theater was still affected
by the Second World War, the United States was the main contributor to NATO's nonconventional deterrence measures. This chapter, therefore, will focus mainly on the U.S.
developments and how they affected the East-West relations. Other allied developments will be
mentioned where they had a significant contribution to NATO's overall missile defense efforts.
The historical analysis of the impact of NATO's missile defense on its relationship with the
Soviet Union, the predecessor of the Russian Federation, is split into different phases along
technological and political changes. For each phase, an overview of the general influence factors
on and indicators of the East-West relationship, like crises and treaties will be given to
establishing a baseline against which the impact of missile defense can be analyzed. While most
crisis, international treaties and negotiations have no direct connection to missile defense, they
function as indicators of the underlying status of the East – West relationship. This baseline is
important to potentially identify if assumed missile defense effects are covered by trends
influencing the situation diametrically or multiplied by supporting trends.

Historical Background
The historical beginning of missile defense is closely connected to the Second World War
and the idea to destroy German V1 and V2 rockets before they could hit their targets in Great
Britain. V1 rockets could be defeated by interceptors (aircraft) or anti-air guns, while the only
possibility to defeat the V2 was to hit it off or on the launcher and not in later trajectory phases
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due to the speed of the rocket.22 The issue dropped into the background when atomic weapons
ended the Second World War; it came back into view when nuclear payloads found their way
into missiles.

1959 Nike
The relationship between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies had been deteriorating
in the last phase of the Second World War, but shared interests held it together. This connection
wore off, tension rose, and the Cold War had begun. For some time, the United States was the
only power capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons, but the Soviet Union worked hard to
close this gap. The Soviet Union acquired the capability to deploy nuclear weapons in 1949. The
first nuclear test with medium-range ballistic missiles took place in 1953. The missiles had a
range between 1000 and 3000 kilometers. Even though these missiles could not reach the U.S.
directly, they were able to reach Europe. The path of missile development towards a greater
range, speed, and payload was foreseeable. These factors created the conditions for the U.S. and
NATO to develop and acquire ballistic missile defense systems.
NATO´s defense posture called for a “forward defense strategy,” pushing its defenses as
far east as possible, stating the need to counter and arrest an enemy offensive “as soon as
practicable.”23 A major change was the shift to the concept of massive retaliation in NATO´s
new strategy of 1957, laying out in MC 14/2 the need for the Soviet Union to know the West is
prepared to devastate the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons in case of a general war.24 This
need for deterrence based on retaliatory nuclear capabilities was driven by the Western
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assumption that the Soviet Union would initiate a general war with a nuclear offensive.
In 1958, tension arose over the question of Western Forces stationed in West Berlin, then
an enclave in the territory of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Soviet leader Khrushchev
had demanded a withdrawal of Western Forces from Berlin within six months, leading to the
activation of U.S. reservists in anticipation of rising conflict. Finally, the GDR built the Berlin
Wall and fortified the inner German border beginning on August 13th, 1961, dividing Germany
until 1989.25
Around 1960, "as arsenals and delivery systems expanded, […] both superpowers
worried about the others' first strike or defensive capability."26 The U.S. developed the first
concept of a Western ballistic missile defense system with the Nike Zeus program, which was
designed to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles with a nuclear detonation. Zeus missiles
were fired from stationary ramps, making them relatively vulnerable, as shown in figure 3.
It aimed to destroy a limited number of incoming Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBM) and create a defense for the entire U.S. mainland.27 This damage mitigation would have
added a deterrence by denial method to the United States` established concept of deterrence by
punishment alone. With the projected significant increase in Soviet offensive capabilities, until
Nike Zeus would or could be operational, the threat of Soviet missiles increased to a scale where
only a limited defense of objects with strategic importance was possible given a limited budget.28
On top of the anticipated expansion of Soviet nuclear capabilities, there was the
perception of already achieved Soviet superiority through in the form of its missile program.
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This perceived Soviet missile superiority became known as the Missile Gap. The discussion of
the Missile Gap evolved around differing intelligence estimates by the U.S. Air Force (hundreds
of Soviet ICBM by 1960) and the CIA (maximum one dozen).

Figure 3. Zeus Missile Launch – Shows the test firing of a Zeus ballistic missile interceptor in
1966.29

But even the conservative CIA prediction showed a potentially immense growth, as
shown by the graphical comparison of different scenarios in figure 4. These reports were
considerably overestimated, as the U.S. would find out through satellite reconnaissance in
1961.30 The reality was that by 1960 the Soviet Union had acquired four ICBM nuclear
warheads, while the U.S. had 12 nuclear warheads in its arsenal, not hundreds as the predictions
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showed.31, 32 No matter how deeply rooted in overestimation, the truth of a profound U.S.
vulnerability reached the public discussion.33
The impact of the Missile Gap went so far that NATO governments questioned the
deterring effect of the U.S. nuclear program.34 This debate shows the immense pressure under
which missile defense systems were being developed at that time. The prevalent targeting
concept at the time was nuclear deterrence by punishment or what was known as counter value
targeting. This Western approach of assured destruction, which in the face of immense nuclear
arsenals was described by Donald Brennan as Mutual Assured Destruction, which he abbreviated
as MAD for his dislike of the concept.35

Figure 4. CIA´s Prediction on Soviet Nuclear Weapons – shows graphic predictions based on
different scenarios of Soviet nuclear developments – shows the potential growth of the Soviet
strategic nuclear arsenal in four different scenarios. 36
The concept of defensive measures argued that a defender needed to prepare for the
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challenges of an all-out nuclear exchange. The preparation for such a scenario required immense
budgets to install systems that would defend the entire territory or at least major cities of a
nation. This scenario also required the defense system to work against focused attacks. However,
there was not much enthusiasm or funding by the U.S. side to create a complete Urban Defense
System, again due to budget considerations and the potential risk of destabilizing, according to
some voices, existing Soviet-American strategic equilibrium.37
In the early phase, from 1959 and 1960, there was little conviction that the system would
work due to technical challenges.38 A significant challenge was keeping the interceptor on target
as the adversarial missile could use different techniques to get the interceptor off the path.
Saturation was another anticipated problem. Production of the system was delayed by concerns
over the functionality, feasibility, and concerns for an overall anti-ballistic concept that would
need more components than just the interception system. U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara
argued that a missile defense system only made sense if it was complemented by other damage
mitigation and protection measures such as fallout shelters.39 He proceeded to strive for
technological development but tried to forestall the introduction of heavy anti-ballistic missile
systems to stop the action-reaction-cycle he believed would fuel a U.S.-Soviet arms race.40
NATO meanwhile implemented in 1961 a system that would later become a pillar of its
Integrated Air and Missile Defence approach, the Integrated Air Defence System. The first step
was the integration of radar stations, national radar networks and surface to air missile batteries
into command-and-control systems.41 This integration enhanced NATO´s early warning
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capability by increasing data-speed and availability.
In July 1962, McNamara held his widely discussed Ann Arbor speech, proposing a
counterforce approach, and abolishing the counter-value approach, acknowledging the idea that
mutually assured destruction as a way to keep the peace is dangerous.42 However, in the
aftermath of the speech, McNamara saw much pressure in response to his speech. Opponents
argued that a less than all-out war approach would make conflict escalation more likely, leading
McNamara to deemphasize the no cities idea.43 Mutually assured destruction continued to be the
basis of U.S. policy even though Soviet Union actions suggested otherwise.
At the same time, the Soviet Union was facing significant pressure from the existing U.S.
nuclear capabilities and began constructing its first anti-ballistic missile system named Galosh
around Moscow in 1962.44 An additional motivator was the separation of the communist bloc in
two separate camps. The Sino -Soviet relationship that had become strained by ideologic and
political differences since 1958, ruptured partially in 1960 after the Soviet Union withdraw its
advisors.45 The divide became even more apparent in 1962 after the Soviet Union and the U.S.
came to an agreement in the Cuban Missile Crisis, as Mao viewed the de-escalation as a betrayal
to the communist cause.46 The split left the Soviet Union with a new competitor that was striving
for nuclear capabilities at its boarder. The Galosh missiles carried nuclear warheads as a means
of intercepting and were fired from silo structures. The missile in transport is shown in figure 5.
The picture gives an impression of the size of the defense systems at the time. Such systems were
neither easily built nor easily adapted to developing missile technologies if an adversary
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overcame the defense by developing a faster or more evasive attacking missile.
From October 13th to October 26th, the Cuba Missile Crisis 1962 dominated the news
cycle. The Soviet Union had begun stationing nuclear weapons in Cuba, putting all major cities
of the continental United States and 90 million people within their range.47 Only serious
negotiations and a sea quarantine helped ease the situation after President Kennedy had
discarded airstrikes as an option due to no existing guarantee to hit all Soviet missile sites.48
Talks about limitations on any aspect of the nuclear arms race were ongoing since the
creation of the United Nations in 1949 but had not come to any significant results. In April 1963,
the Soviet Union indicated the desire to establish a "hot line" of communication with the U.S.
government, which lead to an agreement in June to start talks about limitations on nuclear tests.49
The negotiation participants reached an agreement on a ban of nuclear tests in outer space, the
atmosphere, and underwater, but disagreement about underground tests persisted as this would
have required on-site inspections.50 This limited agreement shows that all sides were aware that
unlimited use of nuclear weapons would be in neither's interest and the will to cooperate as long
as vital interests are not touched.
The U.S. abandoned in 1964 the Nike Zeus program for being relatively ineffective
compared to its immense cost and being vulnerable to surface blasts. Instead, the U.S. introduced
a new program named Nike-X, based on Nike Zeus, including advanced missile defense with
effectors of different ranges and fallout shelters. It was designed to use the Zeus missiles variant
Spartan, for long-range intercepts and newly developed Sprint missiles for shorter-range
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intercepts. However, Nike-X also had difficulties receiving funding beyond the stage of
development. 51

Figure 5. Galosh Anti-Ballistic Missile System – shows the Soviet interceptor missile in
transport52
Both missiles are shown on their launchers in figures 6. In 1964, the Soviet Union
paraded its Galosh missile defense system, even though it would not be completely operational
until 1967. The Soviet development put more pressure on the U.S. side as Nike-X was the only
missile defense system of the West. McNamara continued to argue that due to the potential costs
of deployment, the concept needed proof so that until 1966 no progress towards deployment was
reached.53
In 1967 the U.S. government decided on a so-called “light deployment” on a smaller
scale than previously planned. The light deployment would be prudent because it had four
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advantages. According to McNamara, it would be relatively inexpensive, discourage nuclear
proliferation, add a further defense to strategic silo sites, and add defense for the U.S.
population.54

Figure 6. Sprint and Spartan - shows a Sprint missile55 (left) and a Spartan long range
interceptor, picture to be connected to Sprint, Source United States Army 56
However, McNamara also stated that the main deterrence pillar is the assured destruction
capability as the deployment of missile defense at this time would trigger the Soviet Union to
increase its offensive capability without contributing much to the defense of the U.S.57
The first Chinese nuclear missile program in the 1960s posed an additional threat but was
not comparable to that of the Soviet Union. McNamara argued that limited deployment of
missile defense in the so-called Sentinel program would provide limited defense of the
entire U.S. against the Chinese threat and protect U.S. strategic assets against Soviet Union
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attacks.58 It is important to note that cost-effectiveness considerations seem to outweigh
considerations of potential destabilizing results.
For Nike-X, it was necessary to have a similar amount of interceptor missiles as the
adversary had ballistic missiles. Interceptors were more cost-intensive than offensive missiles,
and decoy missiles could fool them. To achieve a level of defense that could realistically offset
the Soviet Union's nuclear capabilities was close to impossible. For both sides, internal political
discussions were a significant influence factor in their missile defense considerations. The
distribution of the U.S. missile defense sites of Nike Zeus is shown in figure 7, showing the idea
of a population-centric approach that also protected strategic launch sites.
From 1961 to 1967, the count of Soviet Union ICBM nuclear warheads rose from four to
818 and from two launcher platforms to 818.59 The number of U.S. ICBM nuclear warheads rose
in the same period from 12 warheads and launcher platforms to 1054 launcher platforms and
1044 warheads. 60 The number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) rose in the same
period in the U.S. from 32 missiles and launching systems to 1552 launchers and 656 missiles.61
For the Soviet Union, the number of launchers increased from 30 to 87 and for missiles from 30
to 72.62
The U.S. had kept a strategic advantage over the Soviet Union while the Soviet Union
had invested heavily into the acquisition of sub-strategic nuclear weapons while continuing to
invest in the development of strategic weapons.
In 1968, NATO revised its strategic concept, publishing MC14/3 again, moving away
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from the idea of massive retaliation towards a “flexible response” concept.63 The change was
based on the idea that conflict escalation could potentially be controlled. More importantly it was
necessary to back the deterrence concept with credibility.

Figure 7. Distribution of Nike Sites – shows the location of assets connected to the Nike project
in the United States.64

Assured destruction in reaction to a limited Soviet strike could have been perceived as
disproportionate and thus as unlikely to be executed. It was thus necessary to have the tools and
plans ready to counter adversarial actions of different kinds and scales or to escalate to contain a
limited conflict deliberately. The strategy contained no reference to missile defense, given that
Western missile defense was still under development and only limitedly deployed in the U.S.
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The Soviet-Western relationship in this phase was dominated by crisis and distrust. Still,
in 1965 negotiations on the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons had begun in the
wake that a potentially uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons would not benefit recognized
nuclear nations. An arms race took place for superiority in nuclear missile capabilities, as the
U.S. and Soviet Union's arsenals grew significantly triggered by mutual interdependence.65
However, the U.S. nuclear arsenal peaked in 1965 and decreased afterward while the Russian
arsenal increased until 1988. Missile defense efforts were a product of this relationship and less a
factor influencing it. However, the possibility of future technological breakthroughs that could
lead to the superiority in the existing arms race by mitigating adversarial offensive capabilities
pushed development efforts. Mainly cost-effectiveness considerations lead to limited and, for the
U.S., late production and deployment of missile defense. The Soviet Union focused on protecting
its strategic command-and-control infrastructure in its capital, Moscow. The Galosh defense
system and its distribution around Moscow are shown in figure 8.
Both sides limited their missile defense efforts in favor of investing in offensive
capabilities because of the immense cost large-scale missile defense would have imposed. In this
framework, the technological and psychological impact on international relations was limited.
Missile defense seems to have functioned as a token for negotiations as both sides knew that
large scale deployment on their side would be unlikely.
The U.S. proposed a limitation on missile defense in 1967, but the proposal was rejected
by Soviet leadership.66 A counter-proposal was made that any limitation talks needed to include
offensive capabilities alongside anti-ballistic missile systems. The U.S. – Soviet talks on limiting
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missile defense were welcomed by the United Kingdom, as it saw missile defense as a potential
factor that could lead to a significant increase in nuclear arms acquisition of the superpowers.67

Figure 8. Galosh Defense System – shows the distribution of missile defense sites around
Moscow.68

This view was driven by the fact that Great Britain´s nuclear program was very limited in
terms of nuclear warheads, which would have made it vulnerable to missile defense thus
reducing its deterrence capability.

1969 Safeguard
In the 1968 election in the U.S., President Richard Nixon was voted into office. The
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counter-proposal the Soviet Union had made in 1967 was signed, and missile defense
negotiation, combined with talks about strategic arms were accepted.69 Talks began at the end of
1969 in the form of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I (SALT I). After difficult negotiations,
both parties signed the Interim Agreement on specific measures limiting strategic offensive arms
and the ABM Treaty on the limitation of strategic defensive systems.70 The ABM treaty limited
the signatories to two missile defense sites and defined limits on deployment details, such as a
limit of 100 launchers for interceptor missiles. The ABM treaty limited the signatories to two
missile defense sites and defined limits on deployment details, such as a limit of 100 launchers
for interceptor missiles. This reduced the risk of an escalating arms race in missile defense and
limited potential developments in the already operational Soviet missile defense system. But the
treaty allowed in article XV the signatories to withdraw from it with a six-month notice if events
related to the subject of the treaty could jeopardize their supreme interests. Such circumstances
are no extremely hard to imagine if necessary. The acquisition of ballistic missiles by any
adversarial regime could have served as pretense to withdraw if necessary. Additionally directed
energy weapons for example were not covered by the treaty.71 While the treaty limited certain
types of missile defense tests, technological breakout as well as withdrawal were potential
developments that the signatories needed to consider. While deployment and testing was
severely limited by the treaty the threat of future large scale deployment of missile defense was
not banned.
On July 1, 1968, the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was signed by 62
nations, including the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The signatories agreed to abstain from assisting
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other nations to acquire nuclear weapons. They further agreed to negotiate on the end of the
nuclear arms race to the reduction in nuclear weapons. The treaty is of importance as it is legally
binding and aims at the reduction of nuclear weapons towards nuclear disarmament even though
it binds the participants only to negotiations on the latter topics. Even though the Anti-BalisticMissile treaty was just proposed by the U.S., the U.S. and Soviet Union committed to a treaty
with the aim of negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Admittedly a long-term goal, not achieved
even today. Yet, the assumed potential of missile defense seemed to have not been considered a
threat to reduced nuclear arsenals. At least the benefits of arms reduction and non-proliferation
seemed to have outweighed the potential impact of missile defense. A potential destabilization
by missile defense was not indicated by the developments around the non-proliferation treaty.
In 1967, public opinion on the topic of missile defense had begun to change. Especially in
the cities close to Sentinel sites, protest groups formed arguing that the proximity of missile
defense systems made them a target.72 The new U.S. government took up these concerns and
abolished the Sentinel program to focus on “Safeguard,” a lighter defense system that would not
require sites close to major cities.73 The location of these Safeguard missile defense sites is
shown in figure 9 underlining the reduction and redistribution of launcher sites compared to the
Sentinel sites in figure 7.
The shift from Sentinel to Safeguard found positive reactions in the United Kingdom
again which continued with its view of missile defense triggering nuclear arms acquisition.74
NATO members in general viewed Safeguard more positive than they had Sentinel mainly due to
a shift in context from growing tension and a Chinese focus to arms control talks between the

72

Yanarella, Missile Defense Controversy, 146 - 147.
Yanarella, Missile Defense Controversy, 145.
74
Jeremy Stocker, Britain's Role in U.S. Missile Defense (Online: U.S. Army Warcollege Press 2004), 4.
73

32

U.S and the Soviet Union and President Nixon´s reaffirmation of the Euro-Atlantic partnership.75
The development of Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) worsened the
defender's situation as saturation became easier and interception harder. The U.S. developed
MIRVs in 1970, and the Soviet Union followed suit in 1975.76

Figure 9. Safeguard Missile Defense Locations- shows the distribution of the Safeguard
approach to U.S. missile defense which protected mainly strategic U.S. nuclear assets.77
The development of MIRVs diminished the optimism that ballistic missile defense could
be successful.78 MIRVs enhance an attack by distributing the different independent reentry
vehicles each heading towards a different target. The defender needs to either intercept early,
increasing the technological requirements, or to intercept more targets later requiring more
defense systems and interceptor missiles.
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During the 1970s, the Soviet Union undertook efforts to update its Galosh missile defense
system, but it did not gain any significant advantage. The update reduced the gap that had
evolved through missile development only to a minor degree.79 In 1971, the A-35 anti-ballistic
missile system was deployed as an upgrade to the earlier Galosh system. There was still no
complete and efficient missile defense system that could defeat an all-out nuclear attack.
U.S. President Nixon sought a path leading away from assured destruction towards more
options in case deterrence failed. He directed the Secretary of Defense to compile a study on
potential targets with importance recovery of the adversary and capabilities for offensive action
but excluding population per se.80 The Office of the Secretary of Defense created a policy
guideline to establish conflict boundaries that would signal to the enemy an intention of conflict
limitation with options ranging from destruction of targets critical for post-war recovery to the
neutralization of conventional enemy forces.81 This approach was a fundamental change in
thinking. The assured destruction concept did not include the possibility of de-escalation or
conflict limitation for nuclear conflicts. The new policy was set to establish a toolbox of options
for the President. The strategy focused not only on Russia but also on the People's Republic of
China. The documents also show the U.S. thinking that a nuclear escalation could potentially be
limited in intensity and some measure of victory achieved.
Both parties to the ABM treaty signed an amendment limiting the missile defense sites
from two to one, in 1974.82 The Soviet Union continued to focus its system on Moscow.
However, it repeatedly violated the ABM treaty by testing surface-to-air missiles in anti-ballistic
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mode and installing radar systems beyond the limitations established by the treaty.83 Even though
the Soviet Union still maintained its missile defense lead and potentially could have extended
this lead, it kept its violations to a level where an arms race seemed unlikely.84 The Soviet Union
tried to limit potential U.S. missile defense to the extent of the treaty while sticking to its
preferred strategy of damage limiting preemptive strikes.85 The U.S. decided in 1976 to abolish
its remaining missile defense site in North Dakota, making the Galosh system the only existing
and operational missile defense system at the time.86 The low cost effectiveness and easy
penetrability made a missile defense system facing thousands of ICBMs unfeasible in the U.S.
view. Even though the Soviet Union continued to have a missile defense system, the absence of
U.S. missile defense did not seem to cause any recognizable disturbance in the relationship. Up
until the end of U.S. missile defense, the U.S. and Soviet systems were no threat to offensive
nuclear arsenals.
In June 1977, a Washington Post article noted that the intended defense department
budget contained various nuclear weapon programs, such as the Enhanced Radiation Weapon or
Neutron Weapon.87 The weapon was supposed to have benefits over traditional nuclear weapons
as it would have less blast and heat effects. The key advantage was to create less collateral
damage while being still deadly using temporary (secondary) radiation. The budget also included
several tactical nuclear weapons. The article sparked protests across the Atlantic because public
opinion expected a winding down of the Cold War.88 The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II
(SALT II), which had started in 1974 with major breakthroughs, were going slow as
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disagreements over details on cruise missiles and Soviet bombers were blocking results in
1975.89 High-level meetings in 1978 and 1979 reached a breakthrough for SALT II, but President
Carter requested the U.S. Senate delay ratification in the face of the Russian invasion of
Afghanistan.90 The U.S. offered not to retreat from the treaty as it was legally binding until a
party declared its intention not to become a signatory.
The Soviet Union continued to develop its intermediate-range nuclear forces putting the
European theater in a more threatening position. Conflict flared up as the Soviet Union tried to
replace aging SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with the modern SS-20 system hoping to keep a strategic
advantage over the European theater.91 But public opinion in the West was not in favor of further
nuclear arming. European societies were less and less inclined to see their home countries as
nuclear battlefields and increasingly strong peace movements developed during this time.92 In
December 1979, the North Atlantic Council decided on two significant actions.93 The first
decision was to station intermediate-range nuclear cruise and ballistic missiles (Pershing II and
BGM 109 Tomahawk) in Europe. The second decision was to push towards negotiations with the
Soviet Union on limiting intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe. This decision became
famous as the NATO “double-track decision.” It sparked protests in some NATO member states,
fueled by peace movements, which lead to the fall of the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in
1982. Nonetheless, the document was ratified.94
Still, the double-track decision would prove to be the right combination of alliance
commitment (the U.S. responding to European requests) and with a push towards addressing
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such issues via arms control.95 Negotiations on the intermediate-range nuclear forces took place
but did not progress significantly during the following years.96
In 1982 the administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan accused the Soviet Union of
non-compliance with the SALT documents in general. Still, it stated the U.S. would comply to
the extent that the Soviet Union would too, and SALT limitations were kept in place.
Between 1969 and 1982, fundamental arms control treaties were signed, and the
foundation for arms limitation and arms control was laid. The U.S. and the Soviet Union had also
started negotiations about further treaties, such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START). The number of U.S. ICBM nuclear warheads rose to 2,139 while the launcher count
stayed relatively constant at 1,049.97 The Soviet Union increased its ICBM arsenal to 6282
(including MIRVs) and the launchers to 1,398.98 The arms competition was still ongoing. Even
though the stationing of SS-20 in Europe heated up the conflict, the intensity of crisis regarding
the European theater stayed significantly lower than in the period of the Cuban or the Berlin
Crisis. The technological impact of missile defense stayed relatively insignificant. None of the
systems deployed or developed had the effectiveness or scale to mitigate a nuclear attack of
major scale. However, the psychological impact of potential future developments was enough for
the Soviet Union to insist on combining arms control talks for offensive weapons with defensive
systems.

1983 Strategic Defense Initiative Reagan
In 1983 U.S. President Reagan painted a dark picture of the growth in the capabilities of
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Soviet military forces in his address to the nation.99 He stated the Soviet Union was acquiring
superior forces while supporting hostile third parties with missile technology and deducted the
need to strengthen U.S. armament efforts. The speech identified the need for growth and
improvements in weapon systems as the Soviet Union had surpassed U.S. arsenals in
conventional forces and other categories like submarine ballistic missiles and intermediate-range
nuclear land forces. Further, he stated that NATO had, in 1979, decided to deploy intermediate
forces, but had not deployed any carrying nuclear warheads even though the Soviet Union did so.
The speech also laid the first brick for the Intermediate Nuclear Force treaty by stating that
NATO would refrain from such forces if the Soviet Union followed suit, referencing NATO's
double-track decisions. A smaller part of the speech focused on missile defense. The first step
was to be a significant research program in accordance with the ABM treaty that would push
towards effective missile defense for the U.S and its allies. President Reagan stated that if the
Soviet Union would join in arms reduction, then stability would have been achieved, indicating
that the significant arsenals of the Soviet Union threatened the carefully established equilibrium
of the last years. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) researched various possibilities for
missile defense ranging from space-based radiation weapons to satellites designed to hit a missile
during its exo-athmospheric travel phase. The U.S. invited its NATO allies to join the research
program, but interest was slow to develop, and outright skepticism became public.100 Canada for
example refused to join the research phase, fearing among other factors to limit its diplomatic
options when it later came to a deployment phase.101 Other allies joined the program and finally
even France dropped its opposition against French companies taking part, but reservations in
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regard to feasibility and effectiveness even to potential impacts on established deterrence
concepts were kept.102 The notion to start a program that the Soviet Union strongly opposed
during this phase of the Cold War was also an influence factor that stirred doubts about the
program. In terms of alliance stability SDI did little to support a united front within NATO. But
more importantly the reactions indicate a perception of strategic missile defense as something
that could negatively influence the East – West relationship. This perception likely was caused
by the Soviet objections but also by the imagination of where technological breakthroughs could
lead in terms of impact on a long-established deterrence equilibrium.
After heated debates on the topic of SDI in 1987, the Soviet Union dropped the
objections against it in favor to signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.103
The Soviet Union had made SDI repeatedly the topic of negotiations but in the end its focus laid
less on SDI and more on the threat of Pershing II missiles in Europe.104 The fruits of NATO's
double-track decision were reaped, but missile defense continued to be a topic for discussion. As
a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the INF treaty specified the
destruction of all land/ground-based missiles and launcher systems with a range between 500km
and 5,500km in Europe for the signatories. Most allied forces with this range, such as French and
British forces, were not covered by the treaty.
However, German forces possessed Pershing missiles. The Soviet Union demanded them
to be included in the treaty, which led the German chancellor to intervene to dismantle the
missiles, a unilateral act that did not become part of the treaty.105
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SDI, in this context, which the Soviet Union had objected since its announcement, was
perceived as a much lesser threat than a build-up of NATO intermediate range nuclear forces in
Europe. Even though the ABM treaty limited a deployment, a potential technological
breakthrough could have led to a U.S. withdrawal in accordance with the treaty. This indicates
that SDI while being objected was apparently not perceived as an immediate threat to Soviet
strategic capabilities, thus the objections were dropped in favor of a focus on nuclear capabilities.
In 1986, the Reagan administration ended its voluntary restraint based on the SALT II
treaty and stated it would decide over its force posture based on the Soviet threat as the Soviet
Union had repeatedly violated the SALT documents.106 The Soviet Union halted the operation of
the debated Krasnoyarsk Radar in 1987 and instead added various radars and infrared-based
launch detection satellites but still violated the treaty by not placing all installations at its
perimeter .107 The potential end to U.S. arms limitations led to a more restrained Soviet behavior
without completely ending treaty violations. The U.S. and the Soviet Union ratified the
Threshold Test Ban Treaty in 1990. This was possible after the setup of the joint verification
experiment in 1988, a program to test the concept of joint on-site measures of nuclear yield after
a test. The lasting debate on verification for the treaty was solved and nuclear tests of more than
150kilotons were prohibited.108 The success of the joint verification experiment and agreement
on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty shows a baseline willingness to cooperate in the face of a still
tense Cold War in 1988.
The number of Soviet nuclear warheads had changed in the period from 1982 to 1990
from 6,282 to 6,938 ICBM warheads and to 1,378 for the launcher systems.109 The number of

106

U.S. Department of State: SALT II (1979).
Edward Warner III, The Defense Policy of the Soviet Union (Santa Monica: Rand August 1989) 85.
108
Sig Hecker. ´The Joint Verification Experiment´, Accessed July 16, 2021.
109
Norris and Cochran, Nuclear Weapons Data Book, 18 and 25.
107

40

U.S. strategic launcher systems had decreased from 1,039 to 1,000 system and increased for
ICBM warheads from 2,139 to 2,440.110 The number of U.S SLBM launchers increased from
520 to 608 and SLBM warheads from 4768 to 5216.111 The Soviet Union´s numbers for SLBM
launchers changed from 990 to 908, warheads changed from 1,866 to 2,900.112 The focus of
Soviet Union forces in this period was on land-based forces, which indicates that U.S. missile
defense was not a predominant consideration as SLBMs are potentially harder to intercept. While
missile defense was limited through the ABM treaty, SDI could have meant a potential
technological breakthrough for the U.S. outpacing Russian capabilities. But the prospect seemed
either unlikely or not threatening enough for the Soviet Union or Russia to restructure its
strategic forces towards this threat. The limited changes in strategic nuclear arsenals in this
period indicate a stable balance between the conflicting parties.
The debate about SDI´s impact is still not settled but appears to have been limited.113
There are views that SDI may have defeated the Soviet Union by uncovering that it would not
have a chance to compete in yet another technological field such as space-based missile
defense.114 However, other voices see the impact much more limited. Still, the Soviet Union
made the program a key point for the U.N. Summits in Geneva 1985 and Reykjavik 1986,
indicating certain importance at least as negotiation object.115 But the primary drivers for the end
of the Soviet Union were the decline of its economy and rising domestic political pressure. The
Soviet economic growth had slowed significantly from the mid-seventies due to the challenges

110

Norris and Cochran, Nuclear Weapons Data Book, 18 and 25.
Norris and Cochran, Nuclear Weapons Data Book, 33.
112
Norris and Cochran, Nuclear Weapons Data Book, 37.
113
Podvig, ´Did Star Wars Help End the Cold War?´, 4.
114
Grover Norquist. ´Gorby didn’t fall, he was pushed´, (2009).
115
Podvig, ´Did Star Wars Help End the Cold War?´, 4.
111

41

of central planning and partly due to the toll that increased arms acquisitions took.116
The GDP of the Soviet Union in 1989 was about half of the U.S. GDP (2,734 vs.
5,642).117 This economic comparison indicates that any kind of strategic arms competition would
have been very difficult for the Soviet Union, whether it be in offensive or defensive strategic
technologies. However, it is prudent to assume that the significant research of SDI in spacerelated missile defense systems was seen as a threat to Soviet offensive capabilities. Signatories
to the ABM were allowed to withdraw from the ABM legally by handing in a six-month notice
under certain circumstances. This short period meant that a technologically advanced U.S. could
have potentially pressured the Soviet Union into an arms race of a new scale. To compensate, the
Soviet Union would have had to catch up on the missile defense side as well as on the offensive
side.
No nation could have sustained arms acquisition and investment in offensive strategic
capabilities and large-scale missile defense (two fronted strategic arms competition) while only
having half the GDP of its adversary under the political conditions of the Soviet Union in 1989.
Glasnost was taking a toll on the influence the Soviet Union leadership had on its subjects.
The impact missile defense had in this period appears to be more circumstantial than
fundamental. While no significant developments, either in technology or in deployed systems,
took place, the fear of potential progress in missile defense shaped adversarial perception. Yet,
the missile defense impact was not destabilizing, given that the Soviet Union dropped objections
against the SDI program in favor of signing the INF treaty.
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1991 Global Defense Against Limited Strikes
Already in the late 1980s, the world view in the East and West grew increasingly
concerned about rising nuclear multipolarity in the world, acknowledging that a growing number
of states are close or getting closer to step over the nuclear threshold.118 The world had already
seen an increase in nations possessing nuclear weapons since the end of World War II. But
smaller nations perceived as less stable and predictable came closer to the brink of acquiring
nuclear weapons.
Post-Soviet Revival of Arms Control. In 1991, four months before the End of the Soviet
Union, President Gorbachev and U.S. President Bush signed START, which had been negotiated
since 1981.119 The treaty limited the offensive nuclear capabilities of the signatories. It specified
the maximum number of launcher systems to 1,600 and nuclear warheads to 8,556 for the U.S.
and 6,449 for the Soviet Union. When fully implemented, the treaty meant a reduction of
strategic arms to about 20 percent.120 The treaty was ratified in 1994 by the U.S. and Russia and
by an additional protocol extended to Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The three nations
handed over their nuclear weapons in exchange for access to global markets and development
funds.
START was renamed START I in the face of an already negotiated second reduction
treaty, START II followed in 1993.121 START I and II were the first treaties with specified arms
reductions obligations, all older treaties had either just imposed limits (e.g. SALT) or agreed
upon unspecified aims of arms reduction (e.g. Non-Proliferation treaty). The specified arms
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reduction codified a trend that after the fall of the Soviet Union was already becoming obvious as
the need of immense offensive Arsenals was gone for the U.S. and the successors of the Soviet
Union could under no circumstances have sustained such arsenals due to their economic situation
even if they had wanted to. Still the specified reduction also meant reduced ceilings which would
be relevant in later arms acquisitions. These lower ceilings were still enormously high in relation
to the capabilities of missile defense. START II specified the destruction of all land-based
intercontinental missiles carrying MIRVs and a further limitation on strategic systems setting a
maximum on strategic nuclear warheads to 3,500 by 2002.122 Parts of the Russian Duma viewed
the treaty as a bad deal because of its restrictions on land-based systems, which were the main
pillar of Russian nuclear forces, and being less restrictive on sea-based systems, which the U.S.
had the higher numbers.123 In 2002 the U.S. had 450 SLBM launchers and 3292 nuclear
warheads while Russia had 232 SLBM launchers and 1,072 nuclear warheads.124, 125
After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the pressing reason for a strategic ballistic
missile defense system was significantly reduced. The thousands of former Soviet missiles did
not just go away even though Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan would trade their nuclear
arsenals for the promise of territorial integrity and access to international markets. The Budapest
Memorandum of 1994 for example promised Ukraine the absence of violence, economic
coercion and support in case of being threatened by nuclear weapons by the signatories. The
memorandum was a precondition for Ukraine to join the non-proliferation Treaty and hand over
its Soviet nuclear weapons.

122

Alexander Pikayev, The Rise and Fall of START II: The Russian View (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace1991) 15.
123
Spurgeon Keeny. ´Implications of the Duma's Approval of START II´, (2000).
124
Robert Norris, ´Russian nuclear forces, 2002´, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 58 No.4 (2002), 72.
125
Robert Norris, ´U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2002´, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 58 No. 3 (2002), 71.

44

After the perceived end of history, an all-out nuclear escalation scenario seemed unlikely;
thus, the guiding premises of missile defense developments had changed drastically.126 Two
scenarios replaced the threat the Soviet Union had posed. These were an accidental use of
offensive ballistic missiles, in general or related to the chaotic aftermath of the Soviet Union, and
the use of ballistic missiles by rogue nations against a neighbor, the U.S., or a U.S. ally.127 This
concept changed the priorities of the SDI towards the defense against limited strikes (up to 200
reentry vehicles) of undefined sources as opposed to a major attack by the Soviet Union. The
adapted plan now was to use a U.S.-based theater missile defense system as a stepping stone
towards a territorial missile defense system. The aim was to create a Ground-based Protection
Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) and later to supplement it with space-based assets. With the
addition of space-based interceptors, it would have grown from territorial defense to a global
missile defense system. With the increased number of interceptors, the plan for GPALS stood
from the beginning in violation of the still valid Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty.128
NATO adapted to the changing environment as well and released the Alliance´s New
Strategic Concept, describing the challenges of the new security environment and including the
threat of missile technology and WMD proliferation.129 This document's missile defense aspect
covers only missile proliferation, as potential adversarial actors may acquire missiles able to
reach the alliance´s territory, a lesson from the 1991 Gulf War. However, the topic of strategic
missile defense was not mentioned. This indicates a focus of the role of these ABM systems as
warfighting, theater-level assets intended to counter short and medium-range missiles and much
less focus on strategic level deterrence.
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The East-West Relationship - A Deterioration Step by Step. The first Russia – NATO
crisis evolved around NATO's intervention into the Bosnian War in 1994, one of the wars
resulting from the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Serbia in 1992. Since 1992, the
United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) had tried to protect civilians and secure free
passage for Bosnian refugees. Caused by war crimes committed by forces of the Republica
Srpska (a proto state lead by Radko Mladic), the United Nations decided for a no-flight zone
over Bosnia for military aircrafts.130 The operation began as Operation Skywatch, the
surveillance of the no-flight zone, and developed into Operation Deny Flight, the military
enforcement of the no-flight zone. NATO forces established the zone in support of UNPROFOR.
Heavy tensions with Russia arose when NATO, in 1994, threatened to use airstrikes against
forces disregarding the heavy weapons exclusion zone of 20km around Sarajevo without prior
consultation with Russia.131 Russia viewed the Balkan region as its domain of influence, as large
parts of the population consisted of orthodox Slavs. Russia advertised the narrative of being the
protector of the Slavs and does so until today. The Russian perspective at the time was very
skeptical of armed intervention and left the phase of liberal internationalism where it believed
that Western and Russian interests coincided towards a more realist approach.132 Reconciliation
with Russian was achieved to an extent, but the damage was done as it indicated to Russia that it
was not seen as an equal partner. Particularly in the early 1990s, the Russian Government pushed
for a more robust treaty-based Organization for Security and Cooperation within Europe (OSCE)
with a strong executive board like the U.N. and enforceable decisions but was met with
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international disinterest.133In parallel, Western governments discussed NATO's extension to the
east without considering the Russia's position on that matter. The narrative of a NATO
guarantees not to expand to the east was refuted by the former Soviet President Gorbachev, one
of its most prominent supporters.134 Nevertheless, it seems, there was too little cooperation with
Russia on that matter, as it left Russia with the feeling of not being an equal partner. NATO's
airstrike intervention drove the further deterioration into the Bosnian War in 1995.
In 1995 the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs had decided to end the war within the year by
taking the three U.N. protected, safe havens for the Muslim minority.135 The Western decision
process evolved around the dispute of peacekeeping vs. peace enforcing, as most nations had
placed their forces under U.N. control for a "traditional peacekeeping" task. The horrors and
U.N. failure witnessed at Srebrenica in July 1995 changed the allied openness and U.S.
willingness for decisive intervention and finally led to the North Atlantic Council's decision to
initiate Operation Deliberate Force.136 This operation degraded the Bosnian forces to such a
degree that it forced Bosnian leaders to the table and led to the Dayton Accords' signing in
November 1995. Even though Russia did not intervene diplomatically for the Serbs, the
infringement on Russia's perceived sphere of influence since 1993, and now open intervention
was no less significant to the deterioration of the Russian – Western relationship.137
Additionally in 1995, Russia finished another upgrade of its ABM system, deploying the
A 135 ABM system, and showing constant work on developing missile defense beyond the end
of the Cold War. As the A 35 ABM system before, the A 135 continued to carry nuclear
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warheads on its interceptor missiles, while the U.S. had abolished this approach in 1976 by
ending its missile defense deployment. Russia continued its work on strategic missile defense,
but no tension arouse between NATO and Russia over this topic. Figure 10 shows the
distribution of the updated missile defense sites around Moscow.

Figure 10. Updated Missile Defense Sites – shows the distribution of missile defense systems
around Moscow after its second upgrade.138

Russia´s strategic missile defense efforts focused heavily on Moscow as the symbol of a
Russian empire but more importantly as it´s the command-and-control center.
In 1997, the Memorandum of Understanding concerning the parties to the ABM treaty
was signed to create a successor for the ABM treaty that had originally been signed by the U.S.
and USSR. The nations that were signatories to the Memorandum were Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Russia, and Ukraine. Even though the U.S. had proposed the ABM treaty to all post-Soviet
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nations, only four had stayed in the negotiation.139 While the only existing missile defense
system interceptors that fell under the ABM treaty were stationed in Russia (Galosh in the
vicinity of Moscow), other parts such as radars were stationed in other former Soviet nations
such as Belarus. The signing effectively meant that the four named post-Soviet states could have
one anti-ballistic missile area plus 15 launchers at the anti-ballistic missile test range, while
Russia could continue its deployment of the Galosh system. The treaty effectively banned the
other three nations from deploying anti-ballistic missile defense systems.140 Part of the
Memorandum was that the nations became part of the ABM treaty and its two Statements of
Demarcation. The Statements of Demarcation opened to the nations the possibility to deploy
interceptors with a velocity of less than 3km/s if they would not be tested against targets with a
velocity of more than 5km/s, which basically excluded tests against intermediate-range ballistic
missiles.141
Outside Europe developments unfolded that further deteriorated the NATO – Russian
relationship. Iraq challenged the international community again in 1998, during the ongoing arms
control crisis by baring U.N. inspectors from on-site inspection to identify potential sites for the
production of weapons of mass destruction. The crisis escalated to the point where the U.S. and
UK forces were bombing potential production sites to degrade Iraq´s production capability.
However, Iraq was an ally of Russia, and Operation Desert Fox was initiated without prior
consultation with Russia, further infuriating Russian hardliners.142
Furthermore, in 1998 the U.S. Secretary of Defense published a report covering the
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assessment of the ballistic missile threat to the U.S., stating that several states were developing
ballistic missiles able to carry weapons of mass destruction, and any of these would be ready to
strike the U.S. within five years after the decision to do so and only three months after North
Korea tested a ballistic missile of its own.143 This report triggered a newly perceived need for
missile defense in the U.S., leading to the National Missile Defense Act of 1999. The act pushed
for bilateral arms reduction in nuclear weapons while mandating the U.S. to "deploy as soon as is
technologically possible a missile defense system that can defend the homeland from limited
ballistic missile attacks - either accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate."144
One of the more significant events to the NATO – Russia relationship was the Western
intervention into the Balkan region in 1999 Kosovo Intervention. The conflict between Serbs and
Kosovars had escalated in February 1998 to a civil war with war crimes and atrocities being
committed to an extend that Europe had not seen for years without an intervention, Russia
however, led by self-interest, blocked a U.N.-mandate to restore the peace. 145, 146 Pressed by the
destabilizing character of the conflict to the region, with migrants fleeing to Western Europe and
under the impression of a "Responsibility to Protect," NATO decided to intervene against the
Serbian regime of Slobodan Milosevic.147 At the onset of the conflict, U.N. resolutions 1160 and
1199 created an embargo against Yugoslavia, condemned the outbreaks of violence, and
demanded the parties to restore peace. An OSCE verification mission was in Kosovo to ensure
compliance with human rights but was evacuated as violence flared up again after the Serbian
side refused to sign the negotiated treaty of Rambouillet, which would have specified the

143

Missile Defense Advocacy Association. ´U.S. Missile Defense Policy´, Accessed July 25, 2021.
Greg Thielmann. ´The National Missile Defense Act of 1999´, (2009).
145
Oksana Antonenko, ´Russia and the Deadlock over Kosovo Russia´, Russie Nie Visions No.21 (July 2007), 5.
146
Erik Yesson, ´NATO and Russia in Kosovo´, Perspectives No. 13, Special Issue: The Balkans, NATO and
European Security after the Kosovo War (Winter 1999/2000), 11.
147
Huma Haider. ´The responsibility to protect´, (2013).
144

50

disarmament of Albanian Militias and a withdrawal of armed Serbian forces from Kosovo while
deploying a 30,000 soldiers strong enabling NATO force to the region.148 Again the West and
Russia and voted for different approaches, but this time NATO was criticized for having stepped
over the so far acknowledged lines of international law by relying on the so-called Responsibility
to Protect for the intervention instead of an U.N. mandate which Russia had blocked. The events
during the Balkan crises lead to a severe deterioration in the relationship between NATO and
Russia. While NATO kept the door open for Russia to cooperate in missile defense it was a
burden to the relationship adding up with following developments. Russian reactions to future
missile defense developments have to be viewed, besides the Russian strategic goals achieved
through propaganda, in the context of these past developments.
In March 1999, another significant test for the NATO – Russia relationship was the first
NATO Enlargement, besides Germanies reunification in 1990, as NATO approved Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic for membership status.149 Some argue that the severe fallout
from the enlargement was avoided as no immediate debate broke out after the decision in
1997.150 When the enlargement neared, the Russian Government may have abstained from
confrontation, but Duma representatives voiced their concern and assumed evil intentions of
NATO, using a moment of Russian weakness to expand.151 Later voices viewed the Russian
reaction to NATO's 1999 intervention in former Yugoslavia as a result of NATO's enlargement
the same year.152 It was another step adding to the already created void between East and West.
While none of these steps was taken with evil intention towards Russia, all of them indicated to

148

OSCE, Kosovo - An analysis of the human rights findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission October 1998
to June 1999 (Warsaw: OSCE 1999) 32.
149
Igor Zevelev, NATO´s Enlargement and Russian Perception of Eurasian Political Frontiers, (2011), 8.
150
Szayna, Thomas. ´142 The Enlargement of NATO and Central European Politics´, (1997).
151
Raymond Mas, ´NATO's Expansion: A Russian Perspective´, Insight Turkey No. 12 (1998), 114.
152
Zevelev, NATO’s Enlargement, 4.

51

Russia that the West would fight for its interests ignoring Russian concerns to an extend that
showed a Western perception of Russia as a junior partner at best.
NATO published its next Strategic Concept in April 1999. In the wake of the
humanitarian interventions of the 1990s, NATO had added Crisis Management and Partnership
as core tasks to create security beyond its members' borders before a regional crisis could impact
NATO´s security.153 The document, like its predecessor, stated the threat of missile and WMD
proliferation but made a stronger statement on the need for missile defense to protect the alliance
against WMD and their means of delivery. The threat of the rogue Iraq regime lead by Saddam
Hussein and the uncovered WMD development and production programs by the U.N. inspections
in Iraq had led to the impression of significant threat to the alliance. Missile defense acquired a
more prominent role but again, not with a focus on Russia as a potential near-peer competitor but
against unpredictable regimes outside the Euro-Atlantic Theater. The focus laid again on limited
strikes.
Russia developed a new nuclear doctrine in 1999, introducing the idea of nuclear
deterrence of conventional conflict, the first significant change since 1993, when Russia had
ended the Soviet no-first-use policy reducing self-imposed limitations.154 This Russian doctrine
showed a new task for nuclear forces. In contrast, until this point, Russian nuclear forces had the
task to conduct a massive (retaliatory) strike as part of a greater deterrence framework. While the
Soviet Union had a concept of potentially winning a nuclear escalation in the sense of a major
conflict, the new Russian doctrine connected potential nuclear weapons deployment with lower
(regional) conflict escalation levels. Even though nuclear weapons use became a potent option,
to Russia, for limiting a conflict, the Duma ratified START II in April 2000. It included,
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however, the caveat that the Russian Federation would only observe the limits specified by
START II if the U.S. would stay a party to the anti-ballistic missile treaty. The ratification had
been postponed several times due to NATO extension to the East and Military Operations in Iraq
and Yugoslavia. From the Russian viewpoint, START II had the disadvantage of prohibiting
land-based MIRVs. This limitation would require Russia to sustain nuclear forces (launchers and
warheads) as close to the imposed limits as possible, to keep its deterrence capabilities.155
Otherwise, its offensive potential could, in the Russian perception, be degraded by missile
defense systems.
The number of nuclear warheads of the Soviet Union had changed in the period from
1990 to 2000 from 6,938 ICBM warheads to 3,544 and 1,378 to 760 for the launcher systems,
that for the U.S. from 1,000 launchers to 500 and from 2,440 to 2,000 for ICBM warheads.156 157
158

The significant reduction in strategic arms indicated and general reduced tension between

East and West and shifted priorities, beyond successful arms control treaties.
Hurt Russian Feelings. Between 1991 and 2000 was a period of extremes in the EastWest relationship. Russia developed into a nation posed towards liberal internationalism but
orientated then towards a more realist approach. It saw that Russian interests are not the same as
Western interests by default. The relationship deteriorated significantly from 1994 when the
West did not include Russia to the extent it wished during the Bosnian War, the Kosovo War,
and finally, the NATO-East extension. Russia's desire for a stronger OSCE were not followed
upon either.
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Summary
Historically the impact of missile defense on the East-West relationship seems in general
stabilizing. In the period from 1959 to 1999, SALT I, SALT II, NPT, START I, START II, the
Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
INF and the ABM treaty were signed or opened for ratification, ten treaties in total. Only one of
which covered the topic of missile defense. All others covered offensive capabilities and focused
on warheads or launcher systems. Still most negotiations on arms control included talks on
missile defense or missile defense worked as an entry point for negotiations. Additionally,
looking at the crisis that evolved during the Cold War, from Cuba to the deployment of SS-20 in
Europe, there was none directly related to missile defense. During none of these crises was
missile defense viewed by the U.S. or Soviet Union as a significant part of the following
agreements. Yet, as pointed out before, the access-point to negotiation success for arms control
treaties was repeatedly the exchange on missile defense. A field where agreements were
predominantly influenced by U.S. domestic considerations and less by strategic needs.
The environment in which this stabilizing effect of missile defense could unfold was
admittedly one in which missile defense would have had no realistic chance of significantly
diminish adversarial strategic offensive capabilities. The U.S. and the USSR had too many
launcher systems and nuclear warheads for a missile defense system to protect against a major
strike. The deployed systems, however, could have (within their respective limits) provided
protection against a very limited or accidental strike, which contributes to stability by enabling
accidents to be contained. There were however several critical voices within the alliance that
thought of missile defense as a factor that could lead to an arms race as the adversary would have
to increase nuclear capabilities to keep up with the development of the defense. The reactions to
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U.S. missile defense programs, however, were mostly contextually connected by economic,
domestic, and diplomatic views and less based on strategic considerations.159
There seems to be one aspect that would have had the potential to trigger a crisis or at
least a heavy debate: space-based missile defense. Such a system would have meant an immense
technological step forward with the potential to deny an adversarial nuclear attack given enough
interceptors. But such systems would have also meant even greater costs than wider area missile
defense already meant. The ABM treaty thus created an environment in which both signatories
felt safe from a costly technological arms race that at least the Soviet Union could not have
sustained. More importantly it freed resources especially for the Soviet Union to invest into
ICBMs, thus contributing to the threat posed to the West. Nevertheless, an impact of missile
defense existed during the Cold War, which was the fear of future developments. Signatories
could legally withdraw from the ABM treaty within six months. The nuclear powers had to think
about what if the cost factor of missile defense could be overcome, maybe with energy-beambased systems. At the same time, the main driver of the rising numbers of nuclear warheads
during the Cold War seems to be the number of adversarial nuclear warheads of the adversary.
Another influence of missile defense exists in the form of creating a minimum level of nuclear
weapons an opponent needs for deterrence. The minimum seemed to be set to a level of nuclear
weapons that the missile defense systems will not be able to protect against with a reasonable
probability. The equilibrium of deterrence can only be established beyond this point, at which
arms control becomes easier. This concept of minimum limits touches the problem of deterrence
between non-peer competitors, which is not part of this work. Figure 11 shows the number of
U.S. and USSR strategic nuclear warheads over time combined with ABM developments,
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relevant treaties, and crisis. Throughout the complete time period no ABM-development seems
to have triggered the development in nuclear arms. Two scenarios could have been possible.
Firstly, the disproportionate increase of nuclear weapons after an adversary established a
missile defense system. A scenario which did not show before the existence of the ABM-treaty,
which in turn limited missile defense deployment. But even with the ABM-treaty there were
potential developments that appear to have the potential to trigger reaction such as SDI. While
the topic was discussed, and actions faced objections no significant breakout movements were
visible. The ABM might have limited missile defense, each party could have withdrawn in
accordance with the treaty. The lack of break out movement again underlines the absence of
destabilizing impacts.

Figure 11. Cumulated numbers of U.S. and USSR strategic nuclear warheads over the period
between 1945 and 1999. Included are important arms control treaties, crisis and phases of missile
defense developments.
Secondly, the reduction of nuclear weapons or reduced speed of nuclear arms acquisition
on the side that established a defense system. In the perception of the time and given the real
56

missile defense capabilities, no party was willing to reduce arsenals because of increased defense
systems and, more importantly, no party saw itself pressed to increase warhead numbers caused
by defense systems. The correlation factor between the U.S. and USSR numbers of warheads is
0.85 which indicates that offensive capabilities pressed the other side to acquire offensive
capabilities. The correlation was calculated based on the numbers in the appendix. Other
influence factors existed, but the perception of a disbalance in the deterrence by punishment
balance was the main driver for arms acquisitions.
Figure 12 shows the same picture by comparing the launcher systems of each side The
correlation factor between U.S. and Russian/ USSR launcher numbers is lower at 0.66 but still
significantly positive and likely the highest correlation factor compared to other potential
influence factors, which were not part of this work.

Figure 12. Cumulated numbers of U.S. and USSR nuclear strategic launchers over the period
between 1945 and 1999. Included are important arms control treaties, crisis and phases of missile
defense developments.
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The ABM treaty was still intact in the 1990s when Western missile defense
considerations were made, focusing on rogue regimes outside the Euro-Atlantic-theater. The
post-Cold War period saw a significant reduction in offensive nuclear weapons, as the former
conflict parties had no need for them anymore. The successors of the USSR were furthermore in
no economic condition to maintain nuclear forces at such high levels. The perception of
potentially lasting peace called for arms reduction. ABM-considerations during the 1990s did
nothing to change the course towards arms reduction.
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CURRENT SITUATION

This chapter covers the developments of NATO's missile defense efforts and the East – West
relationship since 1999. The methodology is set analogous to that of the chapter on historical
developments. The specific structure of NATO's missile defense framework is emphasized to
create of picture of what is potentially seen as hostile by the Russian Federation.
Again, the historical developments are analyzed to establish a baseline for the
relationship, then the description and comparison of NATO and Russian nuclear and missile
defense arsenals will be used to discuss the existing deterrence posture. A comparison of NATO
and Russian missile defense efforts and related official statements will indicate the current
impact of respective missile defense programs. Finally, technological developments, and results
from previous chapters will over recommendations on how to proceed with strategic missile
defense, should NATO wish to do so.

Recent Developments
The aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States carried the signs of
a closer relationship between the United States and Russia. The Russian President Putin offered
full support for counter-terrorism efforts and provided access to military bases in former Soviet
republics.160
Increase in Western Missile Defense Capability. In 2001, NATO started its
development efforts for a theater ballistic missile defense system with two studies. The results
were presented at the Prague 2002 Summit, and efforts were supplemented by a third study
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started by the NATO-Russia-Council in 2003, to determine the possible degree of
interoperability between NATO's and Russia's missile defense effort to create a joint missile
defense system.161 In 2005 the North Atlantic Council approved the creation of an Active
Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) system.162 The idea behind ALTBMD is
based on lessons learned from the 1991 Gulf War to protect deployed forces against SCUDmissiles. While ALTBMD was a command-and-control infrastructure, the targeted missile type
and the likely connected interceptors made it a theater and not a strategic missile defense effort.
In December 2001, the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush handed in the
six months notice to withdraw from the ABM treaty. This step was, to an extent, coordinated
with the Russian leadership. President Putin published a statement saying the step of the U.S. is a
"mistake" but would not threaten Russian security.163 Still, in 2001, the Russian Defense
Minister announced that Russia would not implement the START II limitations as the U.S. had
not yet ratified it, and when the U.S. left the ABM treaty, Russia declared START II null and
void.164 The restriction on land-based MIRVs, the most significant part of START II, was in turn
lost along the end of the ABM treaty. Yet in a statement on the U.S. withdrawal in December
2001, President Putin had hinted at the desire for the reduction of offensive nuclear weapons.
This desire led to negotiations with the Bush administration for a new treaty to lower offensive
weapons below the limits of START I.165 Both sides reached a consensus on a reduction of
nuclear warheads. Still, they continued to debate the path to reduction. The U.S. preferred
unilateral non-binding force reductions while the Russian side preferred codification of legally
161

NATO. ´Ballistic Missile Defence´, (2021).
NATO. ´Launch of NATO’s Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) Programme´, (2005).
163
Vladimir Putin. ´Russian President Vladimir Putin's response to the U.S. decision to withdraw from the ABM
treaty´, (2001).
164
Nuclear Threat Initiative. ´Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Strategic Offensive Reductions (START II)´, Accessed July 17, 2021.
165
Daryl Kimball. ´The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) At a Glance´, (2017).
162

60

binding limitations for strategic forces. The treaty that followed this exchange was the Strategic
Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) in 2003. It specified the reduction of strategic nuclear
warheads to 1,700 - 2,200 for each party, without specifying their deployment domain.166
The U.S. began building the first Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System
interceptors in Alaska to create a limited homeland missile defense capability. Other existing
systems did not have a relevant capability to defend the U.S. territory against ICBMs as they
were geared towards medium and intermediate-range missiles or had limited ranges.167 The Bush
administration planned for another GMD site in Poland and an early warning radar in the Czech
Republic to prepare the system for a potential threat from Iran.
Some Western voices, mainly anti-nuclear weapons movements, were even concerned
about defensive systems to protect the U.S. against nuclear weapons.168 Their fear was deducted
from the fact that U.S. nuclear targeting in the 1960s considered Soviet missile defense a high
priority target, thus establishing defense systems would reduce focus on arms reduction and
instead create new targets. This in turn would lead to increased pressure to acquire nuclear arms
on the adversarial side.
The U.S. planned 44 Interceptors combined with seven types of sensors to create a
defense against limited strikes. The participating systems, their distribution, and links between
systems are shown in figure 13. Even though GMD is a strategic missile defense system it was
planned to be integrated into the missile defense framework to enhance sensor coverage. While
GPALS had aimed for 200 targets and the 1999 National Missile Defense Act was build on an
assumend threat that required 100 interceptors , GMD was planned with 44 interceptor
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launchers.169 The planned 44 launchers would have not provided protection against 200
warheads for the U.S., but the integration into a broader system also increased the propability of
protection against missile strikes as it enhanced the ability to strike repeatedly against an
incomming missile. At NATO´s 2008 Bukarest Summit the allies welcomed the U.S.
contribution of European based assets for NATO´s protection and reaffirmed the will to
cooperate with Russia in the field of missile defense.170

Figure 13 U.S. Missile Defense GMD – shows the configuration of GMD in 2006 connected to
the terminal phase-oriented missile defense systems PATRIOT and AEGIS. 171
Russian Shift Towards Nationalism. In 2003 and 2004, Western influence in Eastern
Europe seemed to spike as NGOs were funding the opposition in Georgia, leading to the election
of Pro-NATO president Mikhail Saakashvili.172 Similar protests (orange revolution) in Ukraine
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lead to new elections, won by Western backed candidate Victor Yushchenko.173 Russia was
aware of these developments. President Putin had personally tried to impact the 2004 elections
by traveling to Ukraine, recognizing the threat of color revolutions to Russia´s political system,
Russia shifted from a cooperative approach towards the West to a nationalistic one.174
In March 2004, NATO expanded by another seven members, approving Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia as new members. Along with the
territorial expansion also came an extension of NATO´s air policing operations. NATO
expansion in general and the deployment of Belgian F16 Jets to the Baltic Region added to the
Russian view of being perceived as an adversary to the West. It was also seen as a further
infringement on what Russia saw as its sphere of legitimate influence. NATO´s expansion
caused the Russian lower house of parliament to call on the President to reconsider treaties and
cooperation with NATO and Russian defense posture, including nuclear doctrine.175 The change
in political stance and the very robust communication as a reaction to the Russian feeling of
being surrounded marked another deterioration in the NATO- Russia relationship.
Russia started to communicate its concerns about European-based missile defense
systems as early as 2006 and added public statements in 2007 trying to establish a red line for
missile defense systems in Europe.176 The then Russian Minister of the Exterior, Sergei Lavrov
stated publicly in 2008 that the U.S. is trying to "surround Russia" and Russia does not fear ten
interceptors but is increasingly worried about the trend of U.S. infrastructure being built
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constantly closer to the Russian border.177 When Russia intervened in Georgia in August 2008,
these aspects of Russian communication added to the Western perception of the Russian
intervention as an act of revenge for the Western humanitarian intervention in the Balkan region
and the lack of Western inclusion towards Russia in the development of Europe in general. 178 In
the short period of five days, Russia intervened on behalf of the internationally not recognized
Republic of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Both regions were already in conflict with the
Georgian Government. Russian, Georgian, and Ossetian peacekeeping forces were stationed in
the region since 1991. The conflict, however, escalated in 2008 when violence between Ossetian
Separatists and Georgia flared up. It is still debated whether Russia stroke first or reacted
justified by Georgian actions, but the result was still the same. Georgia lost its military structure,
both regions, and any hope of becoming a NATO member. The Georgian War thus marked a
turning point in the East-West relationship as Russia showed its capability and willingness to
intervene for its interests outside its borders and put a forceful end to potential NATO
expansions.179 As a result, NATO's relationship with Russia declined further, as NATO
suspended talks in the NATO- Russia Council. Russia, in response, stopped military cooperation
with the Alliance and the Dmitry Medvedjev threatened to cut all ties.180
At the 63rd General Assembly of the United Nations and a press conference two days
later, Minister Lavrov prepared the field for a Russian proposal for a security system in Europe
by laying out Russia's concerns about fundamental principles of international law in Europe.181
Russia renewed its desire for a new security framework in Europe. Such a new system even
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under a reformed OSCE as Russia had proposed earlier, would have guaranteed Russia an
increase in influence and was aimed at making NATO obsolete. In a speech in October that year,
President Medvedjev repeated the need to establish common Euro-Atlantic security policy rules
that would not exclude any of the affected nations.182 He stated his concerns that if the actions of
a small nation such as Georgia could destabilize the system, it is proof that it does not work. In
light of the developments since 2004, the Georgian War shows the significant gains Russia was
able to achieve during its intervention as it discouraged NATO from including Georgia as a
member.
Even though Georgia would not become a NATO member, in April 2009, NATO
expanded again by approving Croatia and Albania as new member states. This expansion meant
another increase in influence in the Balkan region, where Russia still viewed itself as a protector
of the Slavs. Russia had increased this narrative especially since its shift to the nationalistic
policy since 2004. President Putin and nationalistic writers like Alexandre Dugin created a
Slavophil narrative. This narrative puts Russia in a close connection to Europe as protective
power to Slavic people and established a greater Eurasian vision with Russia as an empire in
Europe and Asia.183, 184 The shift towards Eurasian narratives, and nationalism, indicated the
deviation of Russian governments from Western values and put Russia on a conflict course with
the West. Additionally, Russia perceived growing European Union influence towards its
neighboring countries as a threat to its economy and security just as it did with NATO´s
influence.185 It is important to note, the audience for President Putin´s claims of an aggressive
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West, hostile missile defense and NATO aggression, his own people. The warnings against
external threats were aimed to create a united people supporting him as strong leader.186 And
while deterioration of the East – Western relationship supported him domestically, it also led him
to add fuel to this perception. Missile defense in this context became an increasingly important
part of Russia´s communication which painted U.S. and NATO´s efforts as hostile.
Reset in Russian – Western Relationship. The administration of U.S. President
Barrack Obama started a reset in the relationship in 2009. The deployment of missile defense
systems to Poland and the Czech Republic was stopped to, instead, establish a system that would
be more effective and available earlier. 187The step was welcomed by Russia but appeared have
caused irritation in the Czech Republic.188 Further U.S. actions lead to slightly closer cooperation
and to the end of the suspension of the NATO-Russia-Council talks.189 However, the relationship
did not recover to pre-conflict levels.
Also in 2009 the Obama administration decided to hold the acquisition of GMD silos at
30 instead of building 44, the drastic cut of interceptors along with the stop to build an early
warning radar in the Czech Republic, was part of the reconciliatory policy towards Russia, as ten
interceptors would have been stationed in Poland.190 The Obama Administration's cut to missile
defense in Europe caused disappointment in Poland and the Czech Republic as it implied the
image of an unsteady U.S. policy regarding NATO missile defense.191 The negative impact on
the alliance relationship seems greater than the achieved reconciliation with Russia. The Russian
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key demand, a legally binding limitation of NATO/U.S. missile defense capability, was not met.
To mitigate the negative impact of the cut, the Obama administration introduced a new approach
for missile defense in Europe, called the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). This
approach was based on other interceptors that would be available sooner. The reasoning behind
this change was communicated, as based on new intelligence on Iran calling for a sooner
deployment.192 This communication showed Russia that the change was caused only because of
considering Iran and not Russia. Russia´s security concerns seemed less important than the
possibility of a future Iranian threat, leaving Russia unwilling to make any concessions of its
own. The shift from GMD to EPAA was more than a cut in capability it meant also shifting from
U.S. protection for NATO towards increased NATO missile defense integration. While the U.S.
still provided the lion´s share of the system, the shift meant that integration and contribution with
AEGIS-ships, ports for these ships, land-based sites, and infrastructure became easier.
The U.S. Congressional Budget Office released a study in 2009 comparing four
different options of stationing missile defense systems in Europe. The options were, stationing of
silo-based (GMD) missile defense, ship-based AEGIS193 interceptors, interceptors on U.S. bases
in Germany and Turkey, or energy-based interceptors.194 The study analyzed the ability of each
option to defend Europe and the U.S. against Iranian missiles. For the case of Russian ICBMs, it
came to the conclusion that while partial defense against Russian ICBMs is possible, the number
of Russian missiles compared to the planned interceptors make NATO´s missile defense system
easily penetrable through use of overwhelming numbers by Russia.195 The study results showed
that the missile defense system could mitigate a limited missile attack without endangering
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Russia´s offensive deterrence capability. The U.S. Government released its revised Ballistic
Missile Defense Review in February 2010, defining Iran and North Korea again as the
predominant missile threats to the U.S..196 The review states:
Today, only Russia and China have the capability to conduct a large-scale ballistic missile attack
on the territory of the United States, but this is very unlikely and not the focus of U.S. BMD. As
the President has made clear, both Russia and China are important partners for the future, and
the United States seeks to continue building collaborative and cooperative relationships with
them. With Russia, the Administration is pursuing an agenda aimed at bringing the strategic
military postures of the two countries into alignment with their post–Cold War relationship – no
longer enemies, no significant prospect of war between them, and cooperating when mutually
advantageous197

It provides a clear communication that Russia is not the reason for U.S. missile defense to
be developed and deployed. The document names North Korea and Iran as the reason for missile
defense necessity. While the U.S. characterizes both nations as regional threats, their missiles
have ranges not capable of reaching the U.S. but are able to reach the territory of allies. The
document explicitly excludes Russia from being the reason for the missile defense, stating that
Russia could easily overcome the System because of its large scale nuclear capabilities.
The revision of the U.S. missile defense review was accompanied by the revision of
NATO´s strategic concept. NATO's new 2010 Strategic Concept has the title "Active
Engagement, Modern Defense" and provides an overview of the security environment.198 In this
overview, it stands out that NATO does not state the threat of a near-peer or peer-competitors but
lists prominently nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation. While stating the existence of
differences with Russia in specific areas, it defines Russia as a partner in counter-terrorism,
counter-narcotics, and interestingly in missile defense.199 NATO defines missile defense as one
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of its tasks, for which NATO seeks deeper consultation with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic
allies. The definition of Russia as a partner is an expression of the reset of the post-Georgia
Russian-Western relationship encouraged by the Obama administration.200
In 2010, NATO´s ALTBMD reached a key milestone: the ability to integrate different
theater missile defense systems of NATO members.201 With NATO´s focus on ALTBMD it
played no part on the strategic missile defense level, however, the impact of a missile defense
framework should not be underestimated. A well-developed theater missile defense system could
integrate more advanced assets or could support such with its sensors by enhancing coverage.
Still the development was not met with Russia information operations measures.
Cooperation with Russia went on, and in 2011 the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(New START) came into force, limiting the number of deployed strategic warheads for the U.S.
and Russia to 1,550 and adding limits to launcher systems.202 New START replaced SORT from
2003, specifying again lower limits while adding limits on launcher systems. The treaty indicates
the willingness of the parties to reduce costly nuclear offensive systems to the necessary
minimum. Missile defense perceived as extensive or easy upgradable could endanger this intent
by setting a minimum for nuclear arsenal to sustain deterrence. This minimum would then be a
number of nuclear forces able to overcome adversarial missile defense with a satisfying
probability for the deploying nation. Still the number of 1,500 warheads does not appear to be
low enough for this to be relevant, compared to the missile defense systems in existence. During
the negotiation of New START, Russia voiced its concern about U.S. missile defense. Russia
stated that New START would be viable only as long as no build-up of missile defense systems
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could be viewed as a threat to Russian nuclear capabilities, leading to the inclusion of such a
build-up as one of the extraordinary events legitimizing a withdrawal from New START,
according to its Article XIV.203
At the Lisbon Summit, NATO decided to develop missile defense “to protect all NATO
European populations, territory and forces, and invited Russia to cooperate.”204 Russia had
communicated its concerns over this development, fearing to lose the role as a global power if
NATO mitigates Russian ballistic missile capabilities. For example President Medvedjev
announced significant ballistic missile development and countermeasures if Russian concerns are
not heard.205 As NATO proceeded, Russia stationed short-range ballistic missile forces on its
borders and in Kaliningrad. NATO's missile defense at this point was no threat to Russian
missiles. Extensive communication efforts were undertaken that Russia was not the target of any
such measures. The Russian government, nonetheless, saw NATO activities along its borders as
aggressive and grew increasingly aggravated about it. Like the Soviet Union, Russia seems to
know only enemies or vassals along its borders.206 The restart approach in the NATO/U.S. –
Russian relationship at this point was failing.
NATO released its Deterrence and Defense Posture Review in 2012, in which it defines a
comprehensive deterrence approach with nuclear weapons as the core alongside conventional
and missile defense forces.207 The document again did not mention Russia as the aim for missile
defense efforts. In 2012 NATO had and still has only a limited missile defense capability, which
also indicates that the targeted entity of the missile defense system was not Russia as the capacity

203

U.S. Department of State: Statement of the Russian Federation Concerning Missile Defense (2010).
NATO Heads of State and Government: Summit Declaration (Lisbon: 2010).
205
Carmen Cirlig. Russian reactions to NATO missile defence, (2012).
206
Fareed Zakaria, ´A Guest of My Time´, New York Times, February 23, 2014.
207
NATO Heads of State and Government: Deterrence and Defence Posture Review Press Release (Chicago:2012).
204

70

would not have threatened Russia's offensive capabilities. Still, the cooling in the relationship
became more obvious when Russia announced the permanent stationing of its Iskander-M
missile forces in Kaliningrad that it had stationed there in 2011 due to NATO's Missile defense
efforts in 2011.208 In 2013, Russia terminated the cooperation on missile defense unilaterally
after NATO plans proceeded for European missile defense and after having refused various
proposals for cooperation on the basis that NATO refused to sign legally binding documents
assuring Russia that NATO BMD would not be able to intercept Russian missiles.209 At the same
time it is important to understand the physical limitation is such diplomatic ideas. It seems
unlikely that NATO could be able to intercept a small scale Iranian ballistic missile attack
without not being able to intercept a Russian missile. Even though Russian missiles may not be
the stated target, the existence of an Iran focused defense systems would open a window of
opportunity to intercept Russian missiles. Depending on the real configuration of sensors and
weapon platforms and the missile the window could be longer or smaller. The difficulty to create
a defense system against one nation but not creating at least limited protection against another
are immense.

Ukraine 2014 A Turning Point
In 2014, Russia openly questioned the stability in Europe by invading Ukrainian
districts, occupying the Crimean Peninsula and parts of the Oblast Kherson, and helping to create
two separatist republics on Ukrainian territory, the People`s Republics of Luhansk and Donetsk.
Russia used a massive disinformation campaign to blame Ukraine and classify the conflict as a
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civil war between Ukrainians and oppressed ethnic Russians in Ukraine, with Russia taking
control over Crimea only to secure its military installation there.210 Western media outlets
repeated the Russian narrative of an internal Ukrainian conflict. Russia later admitted parts of the
aggression but still tried to blame Ukraine for the necessity by comparing Russia´s actions to the
Western intervention in Kosovo.
Some researchers suggest that acknowledging the conflict as, at least in part, a civil war
could help solve negotiation challenges.211 This perspective, however, has the dangerous
potential of absolving Russia of its interventionist violations of international law. Russia
supplemented its conventional military actions by adding nuclear signaling in the form of
significantly increased global activities of its strategic nuclear bombers.212 The conflict left
Ukraine barred from a potential NATO membership and destabilized for the foreseeable time.
The Russian violation of Art 1 U.N. Charter and the Budapest Memorandum created a deep gap
between NATO and Russia, as NATO member states sanctioned Russia for its aggression, and
cooperation was stopped completely. The NATO- Russia council was halted for two years but
reinstated in 2016 to resume a diplomatic exchange and ease the tension. Again in 2016, Russia
announced the build-up of its military forces as a reaction to NATO´s alleged build-up of forces
close to the Russian border.213
In May 2016, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg published an opinion piece on
missile defense in NATO´s framework, mentioning the European theater's systems.214 Important
to note is his strong expression of the character of NATO´s missile defense efforts, as not
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targeting Russian even though Russia had already shown its aggression and ability to invade
other countries if it serves Russian interests. Stoltenberg wrote:

“…, we could not use them offensively even if we wanted to. Nor does the system
represent any threat to Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. Geography and physics both
make it impossible for the NATO system to shoot down Russian intercontinental
ballistic missiles. The interceptors are too few in number, and either too far south or too
close to Russia to do so. “

It is interesting to note that he states the technological challenge of missile defense
systems to intercept missiles with a launch point close to them. Russia repeatedly communicated
demands not to station missile defense in Eastern Europe as it would be seen as aggression;
however, the aggression seems to lie rather in the general stationing of military systems than in
the stationing of missile defense, a location farther away from Russia could actually enable
NATO systems to intercept Russian missiles. Even if this was the case, Stoltenberg repeated in
his text that Russian capabilities are too strong in numbers for NATO to pose any threat with
missile defense to them. Beyond the point of existing missile defense systems being no threat to
Russia, the Russian aggression in Ukraine and the stationing of Iskander systems in Kaliningrad
indicated a new need for missile defense to secure national air spaces in Europe.215 Russian
aggression, it appears, created the need for the system Russia saw as detrimental to its interests
and stability.
In May 2017, NATO expanded further into the Balkan region by taking the Republic of
Montenegro into the Alliance. According to the Montenegrinian government, Russia had worked
hard to block a further NATO expansion by allegedly trying to assassinate its prime minister,

215

Luc Dini, ´Integrated Anti- Missile Air Defence (IAMD) In Europe: Complexity And Consensus?´, Quarterly
Bulletin of the Council of European Aerospace Societies Issue 2 (2016), 25.

73

indicating the strong opposition it had for expansion.216 This Russian opposition towards NATO
expansion is important when it comes to identifying the real impact of missile defense in the
relationship.
New Focus On Missile Defense. The U.S. government released a revision of its 2019
Missile Defense Review in November 2018. The change in title from Ballistic Missile Defense
Review in 2010 to Missile Defense Review in 2019 indicates a broader approach to missile
defense. The document, therefore, includes in its threat analysis both cruise missiles and gliding
vehicles.217 The document´s threat analysis included a significant shift in the wording towards
Russia by characterizing Russia as a Nation that considers the U.S. and NATO as a “threat to its
contemporary revisionist geopolitical ambitions and routinely conducts exercises involving
simulated nuclear strikes against the U.S. homeland.“218 However it then turns to the statement
that missile defense is no threat to Russia as the U.S. relies on (offensive) deterrence capabilities
to deter the Russian and Chinese ICBM threat. The necessity for missile defense is, according to
the document, to outpace the development of “existing and potential rogue state offensive missile
capabilities.” Some voices characterize the document as a “good start,” but a lot is still to be
done as the documents endorsed integration of missile defense and the creation of a space sensor
layer, only two of the listed items which require significant efforts.219
In August 2019, the U.S. left the INF treaty after having provided six months for Russia
to end its alleged violation of the treaty after being accused of doing so for years.220 Russia used
this opportunity to declare the treaty´s restriction non-binding and its intention to create
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symmetry with the U.S. by deploying missiles in case the U.S. did.221 The end of the treaty,
while being a blow to international arms control, did not lead to the voiced scenarios of a
European arms race. Still new technologies were developed like the new Russian cruise missile
SSC-8, which was the main weapon system that led to the end of the INF treaty.
In 2020, NATO approved yet another enlargement and took in North Macedonia. Again
Russia had put in the significant effort during North Macedonia´s candidate status to deviate it
from NATO membership.222 Because of NATO´s Balkan expansion, Russia has lost significant
influence in the region and the possibility of indirect access to the Mediterranean Sea. Arguably,
Russia did not only lose by NATO taking North Macedonia in, the country has a significant proRussian opposition which could develop into a challenge for NATO´s decision making if the
political situation in the country would change.
In February 2021, the Biden administration renewed New START keeping the last arms
control pillar, explicitly specifying a limit on offensive nuclear capabilities, intact.223 The treaty
is still essential as it defines a number of nuclear warheads and launcher systems that both
signatories deem enough to deter the other.224 New START will have to be renewed in 2026.
Given the current technological advances in carrier systems that will not be covered under New
START, new negotiations could be necessary in order to limit offensive capabilities to the
necessary minimum. The treaty's extension indicated that Russia is not willing to give up the
agreed limit on offensive nuclear weapons even though it has already once indicated that New
START depends on the U.S. refraining from increasing its BMD capability.
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The New Cold War? The current relationship between Russia and the West is a result
of many failed attempts to coexist. Inflated Russian expectations to be perceived as a global
power and be treated as an equal partner and too little Western consideration of Russia´s
interpretation of developments lead to a deep divide. What looked like a new era in the early
1990s developed into something called a “new Cold War,” as Russia violated the territorial
integrity of Ukraine and influenced global politics to achieve detrimental outcomes for NATO,
for example, by supporting Syria, which violated the Chemical Weapons Convention. Even
though comparing Russia to the Soviet Union is exaggerated, the situation appears to have come
to a low point it has not reached for decades. Already in 2012, Russia threatened to deploy
nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad to deter NATO from deploying an early warning radar to
Turkey.225 In an attempt to pressure the West towards a new reformed Euro-Atlantic security
framework, Russia achieved to present itself as a rogue regime that had left the United Nations
consensus.226 This may have benefited President Putin's domestic political situation, but it hurt
the underlying Russian idea to be perceived as an equal partner. Throughout this development
missile defense played a role in Russia´s communication as an alleged aggression of NATO.
This series of events indicates that the Russian protest against NATO missile defense is a
byproduct of events and not the trigger. President Putin had stated in 2001 that U.S. missile
defense is no threat to Russian security. He changed the tone when NATO intended to deploy
missile defense to Europe. Therefore, it is essential to analyze NATO´s current missile defense
system and future plans to indicate NATO´s ability to threaten Russian missile defense. Figure
14 shows the development of nuclear warheads between Russia and the U.S. between 1999 and
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2019. Including significant ABM events, crisis and arms reduction treaties, there appears no
relationship between missile defense and numbers of nuclear warheads. Again, as in the period
before the main driver for nuclear arsenal developments was not missile defense. The correlation
between U.S. and Russian numbers of nuclear warheads is 0.94, the high correlation is created
by the modern arms reduction treaties setting lower limits than their predecessors and both
signatories engaging in arms reduction. The correlation was calculated for the numbers of
nuclear warheads of the U.S. and Russia in the period from 1999 to 2019 based on the numbers
in the appendix.

Figure 14. Number of Nuclear Warheads since 1999 - The development of U.S. and Russian
Nuclear Warheads over time.
Current NATO Missile Defense
The description starts with the characterization and general overview of NATO´s missile
defense, including the main theater missile defense systems. The overview of their capabilities
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and numbers enables characterization of NATO´s systems as either Russian ICBM-centric or
focused on regional threads. It enables further a comparison in scale between Western missile
defense capabilities and Russian offensive nuclear arsenals.
Overview. NATO's current missile defense system is created by integrating several
national sites and systems. The U.S. directly contributes to this system with the European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA).227
According to NATO, Romania and Poland provide for missile defense through the
stationing of AEGIS Ashore batteries. Germany hosts the command center. Spain provides a port
for AEGIS capable ships and other allies provide force protection assets to the system. NATO´s
European theater ballistic missile defense is depicted in Figure 15 with its locations and
contributors. The distribution shown indicates a focus to the south and the east. For an analysis
of which country is the primary target of the systems, further factors have to be considered.
Additionally to the listed voluntary contributions to NATO's ballistic missile defense,
NATO's members provide personal, and funds for the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Centre
of Excellence to enhance and develop integrated air and missile defense capabilities.228
Nevertheless, the main contribution to NATO's missile defense in Europe is EPAA, which
supplements the Iranian-centric part of U.S. missile defense and extends protection to Europe.229
It is a U.S. contribution and linked to NATO´s missile defense efforts but not part of NATO´s
force structure.
Tasks. Under NATO´s 2010 Strategic Concept, missile defense serves three purposes: to
protect NATO´s territory and population against the threat of ballistic missile attacks as a
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contribution to collective defense, enhance cooperation with Russia, and enhance cooperation
with other Euro-Atlantic-Partners.230

Planning, Command ,and Control. Missile defenses in NATO are part of NATO´s
Integrated Air and Missile Defense Approach.231 NATO´s senior body responsible for missile
defense policy is the Air and Missile Defence Committee, while the Conference of National
Armament Directors is responsible for steering the BMD program, which aims at the
development of technical functionalities.232

Figure 15. NATO Missile Defense European Theater – shows the different effector and sensor
sites as well as contributing nations. 233
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NATO´s development and standardization in missile defense are supported by various
institutions within NATO´s framework or connected to it.
NATO`s missile defense follows a layered approach, where ballistic missile defense
systems are protected by theater missile and air defense assets down to the tactical level of
conventional forces.
Missile Defense Systems. The most capable missile defense system is GMD, stationed in
the United States, with the ability to intercept ICBMs midcourse. Other interceptors in the
NATO arsenal are provided by the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system,
AEGIS/AEGIS Ashore, PATRIOT, and SAM P/T.
The GMD system is designed to counter long-range ICBMs threatening the U.S.
homeland. In the layered missile defense approach of the U.S., GMD has the earliest chance to
terminate an incoming threat due to its range. GMDs interceptor distribution is shown in figure
16.

Figure 16. Ground Based Midcourse Defense Sites- shows the distribution of GMD sensors and
effectors.234
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It is a silo-based system targeting a missile in its midcourse trajectory phase by hitting it
with an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle.235 As shown in figure 16, the 44 interceptors of the systems
are stationed in Alaska and California. None of the interceptors are stationed in Europe, due to
the Obama administration´s cut to the plan to station ten interceptors in Poland.
The System has been operational since 2004, and modernization was approved in
financial year 2016 to develop a Multi-Object Kill Vehicle to adapt GMD to the threat of
MIRVs. The U.S.-focused protection established by GMD against an Iranian attack is shown in
figure 17.

Figure 17. GMD Coverage - shows the protection established by GMD against Iranian liquidfueled ICBM (higher threat than solid fuel).236
AEGIS is a ship-based anti-ballistic missile system that targets medium-range,
intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles, depending on the interceptor deployed.
The SM-3 missile is a midcourse interceptor with Block IIa targeting ICBMs once it will be
operational, but Aegis also employs SM-2 and SM-6, which are terminal phase interceptors.237
Aegis SM-3 Block IIa successfully intercepted an ICBM representation during a test in
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November 2020. Aegis ashore is the land-based configuration of the system, which is
infrastructure-based without mobility.
The stationing of AEGIS ashore systems in Poland, and Romania is part of the EEPAplan introduced by the Obama administration in 2009 as a substitute for the planned and
canceled deployment of GMD to Poland.238 Besides the AEGIS ashore sites NATO members
Spain, Norway, Canada, and the U.S. had 98 AEGIS ships and planned an increase to 122.239, 240,
241

The system is currently a theater missile defense system.
PATRIOT is the oldest of NATO´s missile defense systems. It was introduced as a

mobile air defense system in the 1960s and developed with the PATRIOT Advanced Capability
2 package into a missile defense system in 1986.242 PATRIOT defends an area of 25 by 40
kilometers against the threat of tactical ballistic missiles.243 The PAC3 package enables
PATRIOT to intercept theater ballistic missiles.244 The NATO nations that deploy PATRIOT are
the U.S., Spain, Romania, Poland, Netherlands, Greece, Germany. PATRIOT is a mostly tactical
system as PAC3 is not the installed upgrade on most of the systems, however, it is listed here as
it is part of the NATOs layered approach. NATO has slightly over 70 Batteries, with 33 being
stationed in the U.S.245
THAAD is a medium-tier missile defense system that defends an area within a 200km
radius and can intercept endo and exo-atmosperically with a hit to kill vehicle.246
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According to the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, the U.S. had nine batteries deployed in
2019, five of which were in the Continental U.S., two in the United Arabic Emirates, one in
Guam, and one in South Korea.247
SAMP/T: Another missile defense system is the Italo- Franco Aster Missile Defense
System Surface to Air Missile Platform / Terrain (SAMP/T). It targets aircrafts, UAVs, cruise
missiles, and short-range ballistic missiles (with less than 600km in range) and has an interceptor
range of 120km by using the Aster 30 missile.248 SAMP/T is a ground-based mobile multi-role
air and missile defense system and functions maximally as a theater missile defense system.
France and Italy have 10 SAMP/T systems.249 Figure 18 provides an overview on the phases and
distances at which GMD, AEGIS and PATRIOT target ballistic missiles.

Figure 18. Intercept Possibilities – shows the different interception options for each missile
defense system in regard to potential targets.250
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Sensors. NATO´s missile defense framework is based on a broad varierity of sensors
from longe-range installation based, sea based systems, to space based systems.251 Some of these
system are connceted via NATO´s link 16, a high speed communication link between sensors,
command and control systems, and fire units. Figure 19 shows an excerpt of the European
theater's sensor coverage, leaving aside the additional coverage from the U.S. and space-based
assets which are connected. The mainly southeastern distribution indicates a focus against the
threat of Iranian missiles as opposed to the Russian narrative of a Russian-centric NATO missile
defense.

Figure 19. Coverage of NATO´s Missile Defense – shows the coverage of NATO´s sensor sites
showing that there are still uncovered areas in Europe.252
Besides U.S.`GMD, which aims to supply defense against a limited ballistic missile strike,
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NATO´s missile defense framework comprises mainly of theater missile defense assets with a
limited capability against intercontinental ballistic missiles. The ABM capability is provided by
AEGIS SM3 block IIa to a limited degree as the number of assets is not able to cover all of the
Euro-Atlantic area. The majority of NATO´s missile defense assets target short, medium, and
intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and have roles in air defense in general.

Russian Capabilities
Russia´s missile defense capabilities rely on a layered integrated air defense approach,
often using a three-tier layering in which the highest tier is a long-range defense system like the
S-300 or S-400 surface to air missile system.
ABM-4/A135. The missile defense system in place around Russia is still in place and
regularly being upgraded.253 Considerations of potential contamination of Moscow by the
nuclear warheads used in the system led to the development of conventional warheads for the
systems. The ABM-4 system is a silo-based system targeting long-range ICBMs.
S-300. The Russian S-300 is a multivariant surface-to-air missile system. Some variants
only target air assets. The S-300V variant is a system similar to PATRIOT PAC2 with a range of
40km in ABM mode targeting short-range ballistic missiles.254
S-400. Another Russian system that is similar to PATRIOT is the S-400, with a range of
60km in ABM mode.255 Russia planned to have 56 to 84 S-400 battalions with four systems each
in 2020, organizing them in regiments with 2 to 3 battalions per regiment.256
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Developments. Russia´s newest missile defense system, which potentially will be able to
target low flying satellites, is the currently developed S-500.257 One of the systems in
development besides the S-500 is the A 235 hypersonic anti-ballistic missile system, likely to be
an upgrade to Russia´s strategic missile defense efforts.258 A variant of the A 235 system is
designed to serve as an anti-satellite weapon system but has no role in missile defense.259 It
shows how systems could make a transition and could develop into something the blurs the lines
between offensive and defensive systems. But more importantly it further creates new field for
missile defense which could be the defense of satellites. The system in general is supposed to
serve as a mobile follow-up of A 135.260 It will replace nuclear warhead-based interceptors with
kinetic interceptors. Besides backlash for the anti-satellite test, the Russian missile defense
upgrade has not received relevant western media coverage or official statements.
Russia´s missile defense system is based on the combination of updated strategic missile
defense from the Cold War Era protecting Russia´s capital with other sites and forces being
protected by theater missile defense systems. The approach focuses on protecting essential
forces. It is noteworthy that Russian missile defense efforts did not encounter any Western
outrage or much coverage by media or official statements at all. The deployment of the S-400 to
Syria triggered responses as it supported the Syrian regime. The potential Russian arms deal,
selling S-400 to Turkey, also created backlash but more in Turkey’s direction as the deal
threatened to compromise allied air power by enabling Russian access to sensitive air asset data.
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Comparison
Comparing NATO´s missile defense systems to Russia´s offensive capabilities shows that
neither currently nor in the near future NATO would be able to defend itself against a major
nuclear attack by Russia. Russia´s strategic arsenal outnumbers NATO interceptors and their
capabilities by a large margin. A few hundred missile defense system of which less than 100 are
capable to intercept ICBMs face 2,000 strategic nuclear missiles. Additionally, Russia continues
to develop new weapon system including systems carrying nuclear warheads.
There are many potential ends for which Russia could develop new exotic weapons, one
of which is to have a path to break out from the limitations of New START by creating weapons
that are not covered and to increase its deterrence capability.261 Russian has taken a step towards
nuclear transparency in 2020 by publishing its nuclear doctrine, in which most importantly,
Russia states the means to end or limit an escalation as one purpose of its nuclear weapons.262
Missile defense is at a disadvantage to the attacker when it comes to the cost factor. As an
example, the cost comparison of U.S. offensive systems against U.S. defensive systems will be
used as the costs for Russian ICBMs were not retrievable at the time of writing this paper. The
cost of a Trident II-D5 missile was in 2012, $70 million USD per piece, which is without a
warhead.263 The cost to purchase a GMD interceptor is $111 million USD.264 The chance of such
an interceptor to hit its target is 57 percent, which means it takes four to hit the target with a 96%
chance, pushing the cost to hit the target with a reasonable probability to $444 million per
adversarial ICBM.
This cost disadvantage of the defender could be imbalanced even more by an adversary
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using dummy missiles. On top of the acquisition cost comes the cost for operation. David
Mosher, published by the Rand Corporation, illustrated this in December 2000:

“The 1970s Safeguard ABM system is a good example. The Army successfully
developed and then deployed the system in North Dakota at a cost of $23 billion (in
year 2000 dollars), […]. The system was fully consistent with the consensus strategic
concept of the day and even with the ABM Treaty. And yet it survived only four months
before the Department of Defense shut it down because it was too expensive to operate,
given what became to be perceived as its marginal contribution to U.S. security.” 265

To illustrate: with over 500 strategic launchers for Russia, it would cost the U.S. to likely
intercept a first strike (assumed the numbers of interceptor missiles and launchers available)
approximately 222 billion USD, which amounts to around thirty-two-percent of the U.S. defense
budget in 2019 and leave Russia with another three attempts. The calculations for different
intercepts are shown in table 1. Shown are the costs for intercepting one ICBM, 125 ICBM (25%
of Russian launchers) and a full-scale attack of all 500 Russian launcher systems.

Table 1. Cost calculation for three different intercept scenarios.
GMD Interceptor Cost
Factor
$111M. USD per Interceptor
$444M USD per Intercept
$444M USD per Intercept

4 (for 96% intercept
chance)
x 125 (25% of RUS
launchers
x 500 (100% of RUS
launchers

Cost to Defend
$444M per ICBM intercept
$55.5B per partial (25%)
salvo
$222B per full scale salvo

The calculation for an attack is shown in table 2.
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Table 2. Cost calculation for three different attack scenarios.
Cost per ICBM (US)
Factor

Cost to Attack

$70M. USD

1

$70M. USD

$70M USD

x 125 launchers

$70M USD

x 500 launchers

$8.5B. USD per partial (25%)
salvo
$35B. USD per full scale
salvo

The calculation shows that the defender is at cost disadvantage compared to the attacker by a
factor of six. This shows the immense disadvantage at which the defender operates concerning
costs. It also shows that full scale missile defense with existing systems is close to impossible
given limited military budgets. While scaling effects for large scale missile defense production
need to be considered, the attacker can stabilize the calculated advantage by using the above
describes methods like deploying dummy missiles. It further shows that Russian strategic
capabilities were never threatened even if a significant number of GMD interceptor had been
stationed in Europe.
Damage mitigation through ballistic missile defense, at least missile interceptor based is
only sustainable against limited strikes. Moreover, even against limited strikes, it appears to be
exceedingly hard to set up a good defense as the area to be defended is immensely large (EuroAtlantic area). This indicates that in the near future a missile defense system that provides
protection against large scale strikes for the Euro-Atlantic area is very unlikely.
When it comes to communication, Russia continues to develop its missile defense assets
without any negative communication from the West. But it is Western missile defense that faces
regular Russian outrage, media coverage as well as official communication condemning the
“Western aggression”. Russia´s missile defense on strategic level received throughout the last
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twenty years only media coverage in engineering or already military related articles.266 Coverage
on missile defense in general was intensified when Russia deployed its S-400 system to Syria
and even then coverage remained relatively neutral.267 At the same time Russian communicated
reservations towards Western missile defense is supplemented by its state owned media outlets,
facilitating propaganda.

Future Developments
Besides the technological enhancement of the existing missile defense system
capabilities, various developments are ongoing to outpace the developments in missile
technologies or at least keep up with them. Some research projects try to reduce the advantage
that an attacker has over the defender by pushing the intercept closer to the origin of a missile.
Boost phase intercepts with missile interceptors are difficult as the interceptor´s launcher is often
far away which makes having a flight time is short enough to hit a target in the boost phase
unlikely. 268
However, the current development of air-borne energy beam-based systems and spacebased systems has the potential to reduce the disadvantage. Due to system cost and energy
requirements to achieve a missile kill, it seems unlikely that there will be a serious reduction as
the development of offensive capabilities and evasion systems is also ongoing, as was shown in
the example of Russia´s offensive nuclear developments. Hypersonic weapons or speed increase
in general is another already ongoing development that could diminish the capability of existing,

266

Compare to Hendrickx, Bart, Aerostat: a Russian long-range anti-ballistic missile system with possible
counterspace capabilities, (2021).
267
Compare to Jonathan, Marcus, Russia S-400 Syria missile deployment sends robust signal, BBC, December 1,
2015.
268
Karako, Williams, and Rumbaugh, Missile Defense 2020 April 2017 Next Steps for Defending the Homeland, 112.

90

and currently developed missile defense systems. The faster a missile is, the shorter is the
window of opportunity to intercept it.
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SUMMARY/ CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATION/FURTHER RESEARCH
OPPORTUNITY

Summary
The strategic level impact of missile defense systems on the NATO – Russian
relationship is based on two aspects. The technological aspect and a perception aspect. The
technological aspect is the objective influence, by providing intercept capability. The perception
aspect is how missile defense development and deployment as well as potential future
developments are seen by an adversary.
As far as existing systems go, the technological aspect has had a minor influence as no
system could degrade the offensive nuclear capability of the other party to the extent where it can
decisively change the outcome of an attack. Destabilizing effects could neither be seen in the
historical view nor in current developments. The reason for this lies in the cost-effectiveness, the
capabilities that systems offer and in their existing numbers. While complete missile defense
could be possible, it would consume a nation's defense budget without guaranteeing that a minor
technological development could outpace the existing, expensive system. The attacker has a
significant advantage over the defender.
Missile defense unfolds most of its perception impact through the prospect of possible
future developments. The adversarial fear is that missile defense could break the threshold from
being a strategic territorial defense system with limited impact to the point where more advanced
systems could defeat offensive capabilities completely. A destabilization could be possible
during the crossing from limited to complete missile defense. A potential arms race could result,
due to an adversary´s attempts to outpace significant missile defense developments.
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Developments that could fully defeat offensive capabilities, however, still seem far away.
The concept of space-based energy systems over enemy territory seem to have the development
potential to enable such a crossing. It would enable the defender to conduct an early intercept,
but a lot of technological barriers have to fall to acquire such an advanced technology.
Historical and current developments never reached such a tipping point. During the Cold
War, missile defense was a stabilizing influence factor to East-West relations. The immense
nuclear arsenals on both sides made it impossible to degrade the offensive capabilities with
missile defense. The prospect of potential technological breakthroughs in missile defense, led the
Soviet Union to include missile defense in arms control negotiations and to modernize offensive
nuclear capabilities. Even though there was Soviet investment in strategic arms due to the fear of
losing offensive capabilities, missile defense proved to be an easy entry point for negotiation. In
the end complete defense proved to be much too expensive. It is important to note that none of
the historical developments were driven by any single factor such as missile defense, as a
multitude of various factors drives international relations. Missile defense my not have ended the
Cold War, but developments created a further element of insecurity on the Russian side, as well
as a negotiation point.
The current developments show missile defense was used in the Russian narrative as an
allegedly destabilizing factor only after the relationship had already deteriorated. It is used to
discredit the West as an aggressor when it was Russia that did not take up the Western offers of
cooperation in missile defense. Any suggestion that Western missile defense is an aggression
towards Russia is not true. NATO´s missile defense neither was nor in the near to mid-term
future will be a threat to Russia´s offensive capabilities. Russia uses Western missile defense in
its communication efforts, supporting its narrative of being a victim of Western aggression, and
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thus legitimized to act accordingly which is false and a deception technique to cause friction
within the alliance.
The argument could be made that Western missile defense, especially theater missile
defense, could degrade the Russian concept of limited nuclear escalation. It could force Russia to
use extensive sub-strategic weapons, which puts Russia in the dilemma of considering successful
penetration by too many weapons leading not only to an immensely strong signal but also
potential escalation. But if applied in full scale the Russian argument let´s other defensive
systems appear to be aggressive. Civilian damage mitigation measures, fallout shelters and other
efforts could be named aggressive, due to a potentially diminishing effect they could have on
adversarial weapon systems. To follow such arguments would severely limit options against a
potential adversary that considers the use of tactical nuclear weapons an option to de-escalate
(win) a limited/ regional conflict. It would be to fall for propaganda.
As there is no evidence for a direct missile defense-based destabilizing impact on the
East-West relationship, the necessity of major arms control limiting a nation's defensive
capability cannot be deducted. The initial thesis does not stand through thorough analysis.
Missile defense, however, could again become an object of future negotiations when it comes to
further reductions of nuclear weapons. With lower limits on nuclear weapons, the impact of
missile defense on adversarial offensive capabilities increases.
Missile defense is one factor among many influential factors in the deterioration of
NATO – Russian relationship. Limiting NATO´s capacity with legally binding documents will
only serve rogue regimes as they would have a limited number of interceptors to overcome to be
a credible threat.
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Recommendations
First: the continuation of diplomatic exchanges with Russia must stop Russia until Russia
removes its military forces from Ukraine. It is essential to reduce tension and develop options for
a de-escalation of the current situation. Russia must stop its violation of international law. The
Obama reset attempt should serve as an example that any appeasement towards Russia will be
exploited. Russia again violated international law by breaking the Minks Accord in February
2022 and invading Ukraine.
Second: Missile defense systems should not be part of restricting arms control treaties.
The identified stabilizing character of missile defense in the relationship between peer/near-peer
competitors needs to be maintained in an already tense environment. The ability of missile
defense to create a doubt that a nuclear first strike would eradicate all adversarial nuclear assets
increases the deterrence potential of the West. At the same time missile defense denies smaller
rogue states the ability to conduct successful ballistic missile attacks, contributing further to
stability through deterrence by denial.
Third: NATO must abstain from unilateral arms reduction, especially for missile defense.
The idea that unilateral arms reduction would lead to other nations following suit is disproven269.
This concept also translates to unilateral arms reduction in the case of Russia. In missile defense,
Russia has a deployed anti-ballistic missile defense system that repeatedly had violated the ABM
treaty while the treaty was still in place. At first, in 2001, Russia stated that the U.S. departure
from the ABM treaty was a mistake but no threat to its security. Only after Russia had developed
into an aggressor in Europe did it change its narrative on missile defense. Unilateral reductions in
missile defense would create a dangerous impression of NATO having no endurance in
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international tensions, thus inviting other nations to create or keep tensions high in the hope of
gaining against NATO.
Especially in the current crisis NATO could lose significant credibility by creating
outcomes that could be perceived as detrimental to Ukraine or the eastern NATO partners.
Additionally, missile defense technology plays an essential part in alliance cohesion and defense
against limited strikes. It denies rogue regimes opportunities to threaten Western civilization.
NATO, therefore should continue to coordinate and facilitate technological developments
to keep up with offensive developments. Weapons that are currently cutting-edge technology of
peer or near-peer competitors will proliferate to rogue nations or potentially be designed by them
after the existing examples. It is, therefore, necessary to press on with developments in missile
defense to be prepared for strikes with weapons that today are called exotic developments.
Common development efforts and shared burdens in missile defense are also a measure of
strengthening alliance trust, increasing NATO´s deterrence potential by signaling a united effort.

Further Research
The presented work is predominantly based on document research. Supplementation by
more quantitative factors could be helpful to support the deducted findings. The quantitative
factors that could be analyzed are the impact of missile defense developments on adversarial
military budgets, conventional forces and numbers of non/sub-strategic nuclear warheads, and
their launcher systems.
The deductions in this work are limited to peer- or near-peer competitors, comparison
with findings in the analysis of non-peer competitors, would help broaden the understanding of
missile defense´s impact on international relations.
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APPENDIX: NUMBER OF U.S: AND USSR/RUSSIAN STRATEGIC LAUNCHER
SYSTEM AND NUCLEAR WARHEADS 1945 TO 2019

Year
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
270
271

Launcher270
US
15
125
270
473
447
462
569
660
720
1035
1260
1470
1605
1620
1551
1559
1532
1653
1812
2012
1888
2139
2267
2191
2109
2100
2087
2167
2133
2106
2106
2092
2092
2086
2086

Nuclear Warheads271
US
6
11
31
100
200
330
500
720
878
1418
1755
2123
2460
2610
2496
3127
3153
3451
4050
4718
5055
5744
6226
6117
5882
6135
7140
8609
9732
10195
10666
11098
11194
11351
11088

Russia
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
40
53
91
138
153
200
246
321
436
519
653
1064
1314
1652
1946
2083
2164
2214
2203
2397
2489
2462
2410
2545

Norris and Cochran, Nuclear Weapons Data Book.
Norris and Cochran, Nuclear Weapons Data Book.
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Russia
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
120
152
256
343
386
449
497
608
782
885
1037
1466
1713
2036
2327
2469
2550
2681
2843
3565
4005
4518
5517
6700

Annex continued.
Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998272
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

US
2022
1942
1897
1881
1909
1917
1933
2001
1926
1903
1875
1239
1196
1045
1097
1081
1085
1085
1024
1039
1055
1097
1097
1039
1004
961
951
921
891
851
824
798
798
798
798
798

Launcher
Russia
2485
2563
2545
2513
2495
2511
2478
2535
2523
2488
2414
1938
1690
1531
1387
1324
1308
1174
1174
1174
1173
1186
1016
991
923
855
819
748
685
620
566
531
538
558
536
543

US
10768
10464
10291
10610
11308
11590
12314
13685
13080
12780
12304
9300
8280
7528
7778
7323
7147
7147
7206
7206
7206
7206
6480
6140
5886
4216
5021
4298
3575
2202
2085
1968
1952
1952
1922
1902

272

Nuclear Warheads
Russia
7488
8142
8716
9242
9553
9997
10212
10628
11076
11540
11252
10164
9609
8938
8032
7379
7259
5972
5972
5972
5906
6018
4951
4852
4422
3814
3503
3339
3113
2787
2504
2427
2435
2484
2305
2531

From 1998 on, data points from: Federation of American Scientists, “Nuclear Notebook,” FAS Nuclear
Notebook, Accessed January 2022, https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-notebook/.
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Annex continued.
Year
2016
2017
2018
2019

US
788
708
700
700

Launchers
Russia
553
560
562
546

US
1892
2328
2270
2205
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Nuclear Warheads
Russia
2606
2460
2522
2671

